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Executive Summary 
In effort to oppose the use of aircraft by terrorists, the FAA has been establishing temporary flight 
restrictions (TFRs), air defense identification zones (ADIZs), and other restrictive airspace in 
effort to increase security around potential ground targets. Since this widespread application of 
these airspaces, which may be collectively called "security-supporting airspaces" (SSAs), the 
annual rate of violations of such airspace is over 30 times greater than in previous years 
(Government Accountability Office, 2004). This frequency of violations entails an economic cost, 
and potentially compromises safety and even security, the latter by inducing complacency and 
misallocation of resources. This paper enumerates interventions to reduce the frequency of 
violations by more effectively providing pilots with the information necessary to avoid such 
violations (Zuschlag, 2005). Short term interventions, some variants of which are already in 
progress, focus on improving the form and content of the Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) 
currently used to inform pilots of SSAs. These interventions include: 
 Support of better sorting, filtering, or highlighting of such NOTAMs in the preflight briefing 
reports returned through electronic briefing services, so that the relevant SSA NOTAMs, 
which often are more important that other NOTAMs, are given higher priority. 
 Provide improved and standardized language and formatting of each NOTAMs in briefing 
reports, arranging and emphasizing information so that relevant SSA NOTAMs are easier to 
find, and key information within the NOTAM is easier to understand. 
 Provide detailed and readable maps with each NOTAM of a SSA in order to illustrate better 
the SSA's boundaries with respect to significant surface and navigation reference objects. 
Government agencies can also reduce violations of SSAs chiefly through: 
 Representing relatively static or recurrent SSAs on aeronautical charts so that their presence 
and boundaries are obvious to pilots. 
 Using weather information products and other information channels to more widely distribute 
alerts of SSAs. 
 Standardizing and simplifying the procedures for entering SSAs that permit entry (e.g., 
ADIZs) in order to reduce confusion on these procedures. 
 Formalizing, standardizing, naming, and documenting the levels of control a SSA may have 
to simplify training on SSAs and allow faster understanding of NOTAMs on SSAs. 
 Proceeding with fielding new technology, such as the Operational and Supportability 
Implementation System (OASIS), designed to improve the capabilities and performance of 
flight service station briefers. 
 Distributing SSA information in standardized machine-readable format for vendors of GPS 
databases and other users. 
A long-term technical intervention is for industry to develop an Integrated System for Airspace 
Requirements Compliance (ISARC), which would provide pilots with the following functions: 
 Ground and airborne presentation of information on any SSA, including display on an 
electronic moving map. 
 Fully mechanized execution from the cockpit of the procedures required for entry into SSAs 
that allow entry. 
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 Alerting of the potential for SSA violations both during flight planning and while the aircraft 
is moving. 
Capitalizing on a future government-developed infrastructure for the Wide Area Augmentation 
System (WAAS), datalink, and intra-agency digital communication, ISARC could be 
implemented as a set of features integrated in a general-purpose GPS moving map device. For 
example, datalink can be used to upload the latest SSA information and to electronically get 
clearances from air traffic control into SSAs that allow entry. Knowing the position of the aircraft 
and the SSA, and the existence of a clearance (or lack thereof), ISARC can alert the pilot before a 
violation occurs. Within an acceptable development time horizon, ISARC is expected to 
substantially reduce violations while not compromising safety or security. The incorporating 
device is expected to be affordable to pilots and ISARC requires almost no additional effort to 
use, making for a desirable product. 
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1. Problem and Purpose 
In effort to oppose the use of aircraft by terrorists, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has 
been attempting to increase the control of airspace around potential ground targets by establishing 
what may collectively referred to as "security-supporting airspace" (SSA) over potential targets. 
SSAs include security and VIP temporary flight restrictions (TFRs), Flight Restricted Zones 
(FRZ) or Special Flight Rules Areas (SFRAs), and Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZs) 
(e.g., FAA 2003a, b, c, 2004a, b c). This array of different SSAs have emerged from the FAA 
rapidly adapting existing rules and technical capabilities to the sudden new challenges manifested 
by the 9/11/2001 attacks.  
SSAs are on average larger, more numerous, and more enduring than before the attacks of 
9/11/2001, affording a much greater probability of accidental violation by pilots. Indeed, since the 
emergence of these new SSAs, the annual rate of violations of such airspace is over 30 times 
greater than in previous years (Government Accountability Office, 2004). At its peak, the rate of 
violations has been several per day nationwide (Zuschlag, 2005).  
This frequency of violations represents a risk to safety. Intervention by air traffic controllers is 
required to handle such violations, a task that may distract the controller from his or her chief task 
of ensuring safe separation of aircraft. About 15% of all violations result in an armed aircraft 
intercepting the violator (Zuschlag, 2005). For every scramble there is a chance that a sequence of 
errors may lead to an innocent aircraft being shot down.  
This frequency of violations also compromises security. Apparently, all the thousands of 
violations since 9/11 have been false alarms rather than actual terrorist attacks. Such a high level 
of false alarms may yield complacency that delays an appropriate response during a real attack. 
Furthermore, given limited resources to respond to violators, there is a chance that resources may 
not be available for an actual attack due to their being already committed to a false alarm.  
Finally, the current frequency of violations has an economic cost, as resources are spent to handle 
to false alarms. Each military scramble alone costs tens of thousands of dollars (Associated Press, 
2005). Also, pilots who violate a SSA typically have their pilot’s licenses suspended, which may 
ultimately impact the local economy.  
Clearly, there is a need to reduce the frequency of accidental violations of SSAs.1 Developing 
interventions to reduce the frequency requires understanding of the nature of such accidental 
violations. In a statistical analysis of two years worth of violations (Zuschlag, 2005), it was found 
that about three quarters of the violations are associated with long-duration or re-occurring SSAs, 
with the remainder being associated with relatively transitory SSAs. Further study of pilots’ 
descriptions of their violations of SSAs revealed that the violations appear to be primarily due to 
pilots not understanding the details about the SSA (see Table 1). Specifically, pilots often were 
mistaken about the relative position of the boundaries of the airspace. For some of these cases, 
this was due to the pilot not knowing his or her own exact geographic position, but more often the 
absolute position of the boundaries themselves was not clearly understood. Accidental violators 
also frequently misunderstood the procedures for allowed penetration of the airspace, especially 
for the DC ADIZ. A secondary, but non-trivial, cause of violations was the pilot not being aware 
                                                          
1 Many of the proposed interventions in this paper would also reduce the frequency of violations of non-
security and non-VIP TFRs (e.g., TFRs for hazards and air shows). However, over 97% of all TFR and 
ADIZ violations in recent years were for SSAs (Zuschlag, 2005), so emphasis is placed on avoiding SSA 
violations. 
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of the existence of the SSA, especially for SSAs other than the DC ADIZ. Occasionally pilot 
errors in transponder use also played a role in some violations. However, in summary, over 85% 
of all violations are due to a pilot’s lack of knowledge or understanding about the SSA and the 
aircraft’s relation to it.   
Table 1. Probable causes of violations of SSAs (Zuschlag, 2005). 
Probable Cause DC ADIZ2 Other SSAs Total
Relative distance to SSA not understood 40.0% 41.8% 40.9%
SSA not known about or recalled 12.0% 30.1% 21.2%
Procedures for allowed penetration of SSA not 
understood  
31.0% 8.7% 19.7%
Time or date of activations not understood 0.0% 5.8% 3.0%
Other or unspecific lack of detailed knowledge 
about the SSA 
3.0% 2.9% 3.0%
Control setting error 3.0% 1.0% 2.5%
Indeterminate / multiple / other 10.0% 9.7% 9.9%
If there is any chance of reducing the violation rate to something approaching pre-9/11 levels, 
substantial interventions may be in order. The purpose of this paper is to suggest possible 
interventions aimed specifically at the identified causes of the violations. The interventions 
include both short-term changes involving current processes, and long-term changes leveraging 
emerging technologies. The interventions represent both actions that may be carried out by 
government agencies like the FAA, and opportunities for businesses seeking to provide products 
and services to pilots. In the appendix, starting on Page 57, is a list of all interventions along with 
the actions necessary by researchers, government, and industry for each intervention's realization. 
2. Background 
2.1. Characteristics of and Nomenclature for SSAs 
The large-scale application of TFRs, ADIZs, FRZs and other measures in effort to increase the 
security of the national airspace has been mostly ad hoc largely applying existing authority to the 
urgent new demands to thwart airborne terrorist threats. These measures have evolved since 9/11 
and continue to evolve to more effectively maximize and balance security and other interests. As 
a result, however, a certain vagueness pervades terms like “temporary flight restrictions” (for 
example, they may or may not be particularly temporary), so, for the purpose of this paper, a 
nomenclature is established to describe and classify SSAs from the functional viewpoint of the 
pilot in order to aid discussion of the interventions.   
A SSA (Security Supporting Area), to begin with, is any contiguous airspace of specified spatial 
boundaries established with the intention of improving the security of people or objects within. A 
SSA is active when the flight restrictions, requirements, or recommendations associated with the 
SSA are in force. An inactive SSA imposes no restrictions on flight, other than those associated 
with any other overlapping airspace that happens to be present (e.g., Class B).  
                                                          
2 About half of all SSA violations are for the DC ADIZ (Zuschlag, 2005).  
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For this paper, a TFR (Temporary Flight Restriction) refers to a particular instance of one or more 
SSAs becoming active. In this usage, a single TFR may concern the activation of multiple SSAs, 
and a single SSA may be activated multiple times through as many TFRs.3 
To fulfill the intent of improving security, an active SSA is associated with a collection of 
restrictions, requirements, or recommendations for pilots. The possible collections can be loosely 
classified in one of four functional control levels identified here as 1, 2, 2a, and 3, and 
summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2. Summary of Levels of Control for SSAs. 
Control 
Level 
Summary 
1 Flight generally prohibited in airspace. 
2 Flight in airspace requires an active flight plan, a discrete transponder code, and two-
way radio communications. 
2a Flight permitted along standard paths using standard transponder codes. 
3 Recommended that airspace be avoided. 
At Control Level 1, flight is generally prohibited in the SSA. Often however, there are 
exceptions. Aircraft associated with security and law enforcement are permitted, as typically are 
aircraft associated with medical emergencies (e.g., FAA 2005d). The FRZ around Washington, 
DC, along with some TFRs may permit regularly scheduled commercial flights. Individual 
operators or pilots may often also apply for waiver of the restrictions. Within the FRZ, for 
example, vetted and approved pilots may fly provided they follow certain procedures (FAA, 
2005c, Grady, 2005) 
At Control Level 2, flight is permitted but the identity and declared intent of the aircraft must be 
readily available to those monitoring the airspace. This is accomplished by the pilot: 
 Filing and activating a standard flight plan, which provides information about the aircraft and 
its intended route.  
 Continuously transmitting (or “squawking”) a discrete identifying transponder code assigned 
by air traffic control (ATC).  
 Maintaining two-way radio contact with ATC.  
ATC must verbally clear (i.e., authorize) the pilot to enter the airspace whether the aircraft is 
taking off from an airport within the airspace or entering the airspace from outside. In addition to 
the above requirements, Control Level 2 airspace may prohibit certain other kinds of flight, such 
as flight training, aerobatic flight, parachuting, crop dusting, animal population control flight, and 
banner towing. 
Control Level 2a is a variation on Control Level 2 in that flight is permitted as long as the intent 
of the aircraft is available to those monitoring the airspace. As in Control Level 2, flight is 
allowed if the pilot files and activates a flight plan, squawks a discrete transponder code, and 
maintains two-way radio communication with ATC. In addition to this, pilots may fly certain 
standard paths without filing a flight plan or contacting ATC as long as they squawk a standard 
                                                          
3 Technically, declaring a TFR is just one means by which the FAA can activate and SSA. A SSA can be 
activated in other ways, such as by establishing a Special Federal Aviation Regulation, as done for the FRZ 
(FAA, 2002). 
  
 
 4
transponder code that represents the intent to fly a particular path. Typically, Control Level 2a has 
been applied around airports on the fringe of the Washington DC ADIZ where the standard paths 
take the aircraft out of the ADIZ by the shortest route (FAA, 2005b). There are also a couple 
fringe airports that include approved standard paths to the airport from outside the ADIZ (FAA, 
2005b). 
At Control Level 3, pilots are advised to but not required to avoid the airspace. If pilots do enter 
the airspace, it is recommended they proceed directly through the airspace without circling or 
loitering. 
The above four control levels comprise the SSAs currently imposed, although it should be noted 
there are variations within each control level. Other control levels are also possible. For example, 
during the Winter Olympics in 2002, all aircraft entering the airspace around Salt Lake City had 
to be physically inspected. Aircraft departing from airports within the airspace were inspected at 
their point of origin, while aircraft arriving from outside the airspace were required to land for 
inspection at a “gateway” airport on the fringe before being allowed to proceed (Aircraft Owners 
and Pilots Association (AOPA), 2002a; FAA, 2002a). This level of control has not been imposed 
since the Olympics. 
For a given potential target, a number of SSAs may be combined, typically to provide layers of 
protection by having smaller SSAs with a relatively strict control level surrounded by a larger 
SSA with a more liberal control level. For example, Washington DC is protected by the FRZ, a 
Control Level 1 SSA about 15 nm in radius. It is surrounded by the much larger ADIZ, a Control 
Level 2 SSA extending over 40 nm from the Capitol in places (FAA, 2003a). A few airports on 
the fringe of the ADIZ are functionally in Control Level 2a airspace (FAA, 2005a, b). Similarly, 
VIP TFRs intended to protect the President during visits to locations outside the DC area 
typically include a large (up to 30 nm radius) Control Level 2 SSA surrounding one or more 
relatively small Control Level 1 SSAs that correspond to specific locations the President will be 
(AOPA, 2003a; e.g., FAA, 2005d). This layered architecture seeks to balance security for the 
potential target with freedom of access to the airspace. 
The significance of control level to the causes of violations can be seen in Table 1. The DC ADIZ 
is a mostly Control Level 2 SSA, with parts at Control Level 2a, while most other SSAs are at 
Control Level 1. The result is a different distribution of cause for violations for the DC ADIZ 
than other SSAs, with the DC ADIZ being more likely that other SSAs to be violated due to 
misunderstandings of the procedures for allowed penetration. In contrast to Control Level 1 
SSAs, in order to reduce violations of Control Level 2 SSAs, it is nearly as important to improve 
pilots' understandings of the SSAs' procedures as to improve pilots' understanding of the 
boundaries of the SSAs. 
2.1.1. Stability of Activation 
In addition to control level, SSAs vary on their stability of activation. The activation of a SSA can 
be categorized as having roughly the following degrees of stability: 
 Transitory. Airspace is active for hours or days, with no recurrence over the next year or so. 
In this case, a SSA is imposed to enhance security for a specific event at an arbitrary location. 
 Recurrent. Airspace is active for hours to weeks at a time interspersed with similar periods of 
inactivity. In this case, the security for a given area periodically needs to be enhanced under 
certain conditions such as due to the performance of vulnerable activities on the ground or 
due to an increase in apparent threat. 
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 Static. Airspace remains active for months to years, with no set date of expiration. In this 
case, a potential target on the ground is considered to require long-term security from the air. 
The significance of the degree of stability of activation can also be seen in the distribution of 
probable cause among the DC ADIZ and other SSAs as shown in Table 1. While the degree of 
stability of DC ADIZ is static, approximately half of the other SSAs are transitory. Compared to 
violations of the DC ADIZ, these violations of other SSAs are more likely to be due the pilot not 
knowing about or recalling the presence of the SSA. Thus, drastically reducing violations of 
transitory SSAs requires that one ensure that pilots are, first of all, aware that they exist.   
Crossing activation stability with control level yields a typology that can be applied to many of 
the new SSAs as well as other established security-related special use airspace (SUA) (FAA, 
2004d). This is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Examples of SSAs and SUAs typed by activation degree of stability and control 
level. SUAs are shown in italics. 
Degree of Stability Control 
Level  Transitory Recurrent Static 
1 "Classic" TFR 
Core of VIP TFR 
Restricted Areas  
Newport TFR 
Stadium TFR 
Prohibited Areas  
FRZ 
Disney TFR 
2 Outer ring of VIP TFR Outer ring of Crawford TFR DC ADIZ 
2a -- -- Fringe airports in DC ADIZ 
3 -- -- National Security Area 
Industrial/Military TFR 
A transitory Control Level 1 SSA is much like the “classic” TFR, where effectively flight is 
briefly prohibited over an area where it would compromise with security or safety (e.g., during 
rescue operations or space flight) (FAA, 2004d). As discussed before, it also serves as the core of 
presidential VIP TFRs, which is surrounded by a transitory Control Level 2 SSA. Transitory 
Control Level 2 SSAs may also be imposed over major metropolitan areas in response to an acute 
threat. For example, an ADIZ was placed around New York City for four weeks in March and 
April 2003 while major hostilities transpired between US and Iraqi armed forces. 
A recurrent Control Level 1 SSA is much like many Restricted Area SUAs that periodically “go 
hot.” Certain TFRs also functionally represent recurrent Control Level 1 SSAs. For example, 
TFRs come and go around the chemical weapons depots in Newport, IN, and Pueblo, CO, 
dependent on the agent disposal operations being carried out there. A “blanket” TFR effectively 
places over all large stadiums (seating 30,000 or more) a recurrent Control Level 1 SSA that 
activates whenever an event is held at the stadium. Recurrent Control Level 1 SSAs also 
comprised the TFRs periodically imposed for places the President regularly visits, such as Camp 
David in Maryland and Crawford, TX. The Crawford airspace also includes a recurrent Control 
Level 2 SSA ringing the Control Level 1 core, as is typical for presidential VIP TFRs. 
A static Control Level 1 SSA is similar to a Prohibited Area SUA, where flight through that 
airspace is effectively banned indefinitely. Several “temporary” flight restrictions remained 
continuously in effect over a year, such as the TFRs for Disney World, Disneyland, and the 
ballistic missile submarine bases at St. Marys, GA, and Bangor, WA. The US Navy has sought to 
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convert the latter two of these into full-fledged Prohibited Areas. The FRZ at DC is also a static 
Control Level 1 SSA, surrounded by the static Control Level 2 DC ADIZ. The fringe airports of 
the DC ADIZ comprise the only Control Level 2a SSAs currently present. 
A static Control Level 3 SSA is very similar to a National Security Area (NSA) SUA. A 
“blanket” TFR also effectively places static Control Level 3 SSAs over all military installations 
and various industrial facilities that are considered vulnerable or attractive terrorist targets (e.g., 
power plants, dams, and refineries). So far, there have been no examples of transitory or recurrent 
Control Level 3 SSAs. 
The degrees of stability can characterize a particular control level of a SSA, as well as its pattern 
of activation. In particular, a SSA may be transitorily or recurrently moved to more strict level of 
control in response to an increase in threat or vulnerability. For example, in the hours around the 
2005 State of the Union Address, the entire DC ADIZ was moved to Control Level 1. Static 
Control Level 3 SSAs likewise may become Level 1 with an increase in the level of threat.  
2.2. Root Causes of Accidental Violations 
The vast majority of violations of SSAs are due to lack of awareness and understanding of the 
SSAs. To correct this condition one must understand the reasons for this inadequate awareness 
and understanding. The reasons appear to be the traditional method used for disseminating 
information about SSAs. This information is primarily disseminated to pilots by Notices to 
Airmen (NOTAMs). NOTAMS are a means of distributing information of interest to pilots more 
quickly than through new editions of other publications such as aeronautical charts and 
directories. Typically these are free-text descriptions of such things as changes to procedures, 
outages of electronic aids to navigation or lights, runway and taxiway closures, and amendments 
to charts, along with declarations of TFRs (see Figure 1).  
While adequate when SSAs were rare, short-lived, and small, the NOTAM systems possess 
features that make reception of SSA information by the pilot prone to human error (Zuschlag, 
2005). As seen in Figure 1, it is difficult to picture and interpret from a free text description the 
geometric and temporal dimensions of a SSA. To see NOTAMs, a pilot preparing for flight 
typically downloads them from an electronic preflight briefing service such as the Direct User 
Access Terminal (DUAT) or the Direct User Access Terminal System (DUATS). These services 
provide very limited filtering and no pilot-selected sorting of the NOTAMs. Instead, the pilot 
scans the downloaded report of NOTAMs to find the ones specifically relevant to his or her 
flight. The NOTAMs for a single flight may fill 20 printed pages or more. Most NOTAMs are 
irrelevant for a given flight, involving airports the pilot will not stop at, routes she or he will not 
traverse, aircraft types she or he is not flying (e.g., jets), and procedures she or he will not follow 
(e.g., flying by instrument flight rules, or IFR). Within such a paper mass, a key SSA NOTAM is 
easy to miss. Alternatively, a pilot may get NOTAM information through a verbal preflight 
briefing from a Flight Service Station (FSS) controller. With such briefings typically done by 
phone, it is now the FSS controller who must peruse the NOTAMs to determine the ones relevant 
to the pilot, and verbally transmit them to the pilot, who, presumably, jots down the details on 
paper. The potential for error, from the FSS controller selecting and describing the SSA details to 
the pilot hearing and noting the SSA, are legion. 
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FDC 5/1953 ZJX PART 1 OF 4 FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, MARCH 18, 2005 LOCAL.
PURSUANT TO TITLE 14, SECTION 91.141, OF THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR), AIRCRAFT
FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE PROHIBITED: WITHIN 30 NMR UP TO BUT NOT INCLUDING FL180 OF
302824N/0871115W OR THE CEW228033.7 FROM 0503181350 (0750 LOCAL 03/18/05) UNTIL
0503181805 (1205 LOCAL 03/18/05). WITHIN 10 NMR UP TO BUT NOT INCLUDING FL180 OF
302110N/0871901W OR THE BFM108041.3 FROM 0503181350 (0750 LOCAL 03/18/05) UNTIL
0503181455 (0855 LOCAL 03/18/05). WITHIN 10 NMR UP TO BUT NOT INCLUDING FL180 OF
302824N/0871115W OR THE CEW228033.7 FROM 0503181415 (0815 LOCAL 03/18/05) UNTIL
0503181640 (1040 LOCAL 03/18/05). WITHIN 10 NMR UP TO BUT NOT INCLUDING FL180 OF
302110N/0871901W OR THE BFM108041.3 FROM 0503181600 (1000 LOCAL 03/18/05) UNTIL
0503181805 (1205 LOCAL 03/18/05). END PART 1 OF 4
FDC 5/1953 ZJX PART 2 OF 4 FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, MARCH 18, 2005 LOCAL.
EXCEPT AS SPECIFIED BELOW AND/OR UNLESS AUTHORIZED BY ATC: A. ALL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS
WITHIN A 10 NMR AREA LISTED ABOVE ARE PROHIBITED EXCEPT FOR: 1. LAW ENFORCEMENT, MILITARY
AIRCRAFT DIRECTLY SUPPORTING THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE (USSS) AND THE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, EMERGENCY MEDICAL FLIGHTS, AND REGULARLY SCHEDULED
COMMERCIAL PASSENGER AND ALL-CARGO CARRIERS OPERATING UNDER ONE OF THE FOLLOWING TSA-
APPROVED STANDARD SECURITY PROGRAMS/PROCEDURES: AIRCRAFT OPERATOR STANDARD SECURITY
PROGRAM (AOSSP), DOMESTIC SECURITY INTEGRATION PROGRAM (DSIP), TWELVE FIVE STANDARD
SECURITY PROGRAM (TFSSP), OR ALL-CARGO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROCEDURE (ACISP) AND ARE
ARRIVING INTO AND/OR DEPARTING FROM 14 CFR PART 139 AIRPORTS. 2. FOR OPERATIONS WITHIN
THE TFR, ALL MEDICAL FLIGHT OPERATION COMPANIES SHALL COORDINATE OPERATIONS IN ADVANCE
WITH THE END PART 2 OF 4
FDC 5/1953 ZJX PART 3 OF 4 FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, MARCH 18, 2005 LOCAL.
USSS AT 850-444-5646 TO AVOID POTENTIAL DELAYS. B. WITHIN THE AIRSPACE BETWEEN 10 NMR AND
30 NMR LISTED ABOVE: 1. ALL AIRCRAFT ENTERING OR EXITING THE 30 NMR TFR SHALL BE ON AN
ACTIVE IFR OR VFR FLIGHT PLAN WITH A DISCRETE CODE ASSIGNED BY AN ATC FACILITY. AIRCRAFT
SHALL BE SQUAWKING THE DISCRETE CODE PRIOR TO DEPARTURE AND AT ALL TIMES WHILE IN THE
TFR. 2. ALL AIRCRAFT ENTERING OR EXITING THE 30 NMR TFR MUST REMAIN IN TWO-WAY RADIO
COMMUNICATIONS WITH ATC. 3. ALL AIRCRAFT OPERATING WITHIN THE 10 NMR TO 30 NMR TFR AND
OPERATING AT ALTITUDES OF UP TO BUT NOT INCLUDING FL180 ARE LIMITED TO AIRCRAFT ARRIVING
OR DEPARTING LOCAL AIRFIELDS AND ATC MAY AUTHORIZE TRANSIT OPERATIONS. AIRCRAFT MAY NOT
LOITER. 4. FLIGHT TRAINING, PRACTICE INSTRUMENT APPROACHES, AEROBATIC END PART 3 OF 4
FDC 5/1953 ZJX PART 4 OF 4 FLIGHT RESTRICTIONS PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, MARCH 18, 2005 LOCAL.
FLIGHT, GLIDER OPERATIONS, PARACHUTE OPERATIONS, ULTRALIGHT, HANG GLIDING, BALLOON,
AGRICULTURE/CROP DUSTING, ANIMAL POPULATION CONTROL FLIGHT OPERATIONS, AND BANNER TOWING
OPERATIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED. 5. ALL USSS CLEARED AIRCRAFT OPERATORS BASED IN THE AREA
SHOULD NOTIFY THE USSS PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE. 6. FOR OPERATIONS WITHIN THE TFR, ALL
MEDICAL FLIGHT OPERATION COMPANIES SHALL COORDINATE OPERATIONS IN ADVANCE WITH THE USSS
AT 850-444-5646 TO AVOID POTENTIAL DELAYS. C. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT ALL AIRCRAFT
OPERATORS CHECK NOTAMS FREQUENTLY FOR POSSIBLE REQUIRED CHANGES TO THIS TFR PRIOR TO
OPERATIONS WITHIN THIS REGION. END PART 4 OF 4
 
Figure 1. NOTAM 5/1953, an example of Presidential TFR NOTAM. Note: While fairly typcial 
for a Presidential TFR NOTAM, most non-TFR NOTAMs are considerably shorter. Use of all-
capital letters is from the orginal NOTAM. User of Courier font as above is typical of DUATS. 
2.3. Current Efforts to Improve SSA Awareness and Understanding 
Recognizing that improved knowledge and understanding of SSAs is key to reducing accidental 
violations of them, the FAA has taken significant steps to improve the dissemination of SSA 
information, relying less on NOTAMs. Developed and maintained through NAS Aeronautical 
Information Management Enterprise System (NAIMES) program, the FAA now has a web site 
that lists all active and upcoming SSA activations (and non-SSA TFRs as well), providing links 
to the associated NOTAM, and, more significantly, a map illustrating the SSA (AOPA, 2003b; 
FAA, 2005e). The NOTAM gives the times of effect in both universal coordinate time and more 
convenient local time. Some information within the NOTAM is broken out into a column of 
fields for easier reading. This web site undergoes periodic improvements to provide better and 
easier to access information on SSAs (e.g., AOPA, 2003c). Meanwhile NAIMES has 
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supplemented this web site with another with more detailed maps and more powerful map 
manipulation tools for pilots (currently at https://www.tfrfaa.naimes.faa.gov/TfrFAA2/start.do). 
The FAA has also updated its paper publications. Some recurrent and static SSAs, such as the DC 
ADIZ and FRZ and the SSA for the presidential residence in Kennebunkport, ME, now appear on 
charts. In the official Airport/Facility Directory (AFD) (FAA, 2004d) the entries for airports in 
the FRZ now warn that "compliance with SFAR 94 is required," SFAR 94 being the regulations 
governing flight in the FRZ.  
Other efforts to keep pilots informed of SSAs have been attempted. A review of Aviation Safety 
Reporting System reports on SSA violations4 indicates that sometimes (but not always) SSAs are 
announced over the local airport's Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS), which 
otherwise provides key weather information for airborne pilots. Local FAA officials held for 
pilots in the DC area informative seminars on the DC ADIZ, a large static Control Level 2 SSA 
that alone has been responsible for half of all violations (AOPA, 2004a). As a long term 
intervention, the FAA continues to develop and deploy the Operational and Supportability 
Implementation System (OASIS), a sophisticated tool for FSS briefers that supports easier 
sorting, reviewing, and alerting of SSAs relevant to a particular flight. 
Other organizations, including private companies, have also attempted to make relevant SSA 
information more accessible and understandable to pilots. Internet Marine and Aviation Planning 
Services (IMAPS), DUATS, and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) each 
maintain a web site with maps of SSAs that supplement those provided by the FAA5. DUATS 
and DUAT provide NOTAM "highlights" in easier-to-read tabular format. The AOPA’s web site 
provides extensive SSA information and training materials, along with a formatted plain-language 
"translation" of complex NOTAMs (AOPA, 2005a). AOPA also provides a service that emails 
pilots if a SSA is activated in their region and IMAPS provides a similar service. In addition to 
web sites, dedicated personal computer clients are available for purchase, including DUATS 
Golden Eagle, Jeppesen FliteStar, and IMAPS AeroPlanner, that each graphically show SSAs on 
flight planning maps. 
The combined efforts appear to be having an effect.  After peaking at 231 violations of SSAs per 
month in the third quarter of 2003, the frequency of violations has progressively declined to 87 
violations per month in the second quarter of 2004. However the current rate of violations is still 
over 30 times higher than in the years prior to 9/11/01 (Government Accountability Office, 2004).  
While the above interventions were crucial, they also had limitations, although with updates and 
improvements being continuously applied, some limitations are perhaps being addressed. 
Airport/Facility Directory entries for airports within the DC ADIZ do not mention that special 
procedures are necessary to fly to them. There has been substantial delay in updating charts. The 
DC ADIZ did not appear on charts until 12 months after it was imposed (charts are normally re-
issued about every 6 months), resulting in charts showing the FRZ but not the ADIZ. In some 
cases during that period, a pilot, who knew the ADIZ existed, confused the smaller FRZ shown 
on the charts with the much larger ADIZ, resulting in a violation. The current sectional charts 
depict a 5 nm radius SSA around Camp David, apparently based on a canceled NOTAM from 
2002 (AOPA, 2002b; FAA, 2004e). More recently, the SSA for Camp David has been 10 nm 
radius. Reports indicate that some pilots accidentally violated this SSA because they assumed the 
chart depiction was for 10 nm, not 5 nm (Zuschlag, 2005).  
                                                          
4 This is the same corpus of reports used in Zuschlag (2005). 
5 The federal National Interagency Fire Center uses IMAPS's products to also provide SSA maps in 
addition to maps for forest fire TFRs and other concerns 
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As for more transitory SSAs, the FAA web site does not provide a map for all of them, and when 
there are maps, they may not have all the details necessary to interpret the map (see Figure 2), 
although recently the FAA has incorporated the capacity to layer additional information through a 
separate link. This includes ATC center boundaries, highways (unlabeled), a widely spaced 
graticule, cities and metro areas and SUAs, along with airports and certain navigation aids shown 
in Figure 2. The web site has some information from the related NOTAM in an easier to read 
tabular format, it is not the most critical information: position, boundaries, and control level.  
 
Figure 2. Default map of the SSAs described in NOTAM 5/1953 (see Figure 1) as provided 
on the FAA TFR web site (FAA, 2005e). Value contrast is intensified in this gray-scale 
reproduction. In the original image, water bodies (gray in above image) are light blue, and SSA 
boundaries (black in above image) are red. 
Alternatively, the FAA web sites (including the newest NAIMES site) represent the SSAs 
superimposed on a raster scanned sectional aeronautical chart, similar to that seen in Figure 3. 
This practice also followed by private pilot information services such as DUATS and IMAPS, 
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and appears superior to the sparse map format shown in Figure 2. Such maps provide nearly all 
the necessary details using standard symbology and ease cross-referencing to standard 
aeronautical charts. Such maps also have limitations, largely due sectionals being designed for 
high-resolution color printing on a large sheet of paper. When scanned into a computer, the result 
is too much information: a cluttered map that is difficult to read, especially when viewed on a 
computer screen or printed on a standard-sized paper in black-and-white. 
 
Figure 3. SSAs described in NOTAM 5/1953 (see Figure 1) when superimposed on a raster-
scanned map. This DUATS-provided screen capture is similar to other maps provided by the 
FAA and IMAPS for computer screen presentation. The resolution is inferior to the original paper 
sectional, making most of the text and many symbols at this level of zoom illegible. Zooming in 
improves legibility, but eliminates the context. The original screen image for this figure was full 
color, with the SSAs rendered as three bright red circles, but when printed on a black and white 
printer, it would appear much like above. 
3. Goals and Principles for Interventions 
This paper aims to propose the most realistic, feasible, and effective interventions to reducing 
accidental violations of SSAs. Reducing the frequency of violations by an order of magnitude is 
an ambitious goal. Violations need to be vastly reduced for static and recurrent SSAs to decrease 
the frequency by 75% of the current rate. Decreasing it down to about 10% requires that 
interventions substantially reduce the violations of presidential TFRs (e.g., Figure 1), which 
account for nearly a quarter of all violations. These TFRs represent a particular challenge:  
 They usually cover a large populated area, typically being 30 nm in radius with altitudes 
extending to 18,000 feet, and thus confront a large population of pilots when activated. 
 They have complex structures, typically including two or more nested SSAs each with 
different control levels or activation periods. 
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 They have complex procedures, usually including a variation of Control Level 2, which, as 
observed with the DC and NY ADIZ, can be difficult to understand when first imposed.  
 They can occur anywhere and anytime on short notice, making it more likely that pilots will 
not be expecting or preparing for them, and will be unfamiliar with the requirements. 
Achieving an order of magnitude reduction in the frequency of violations is only likely by 
adopting the pragmatic approach of acknowledging that accidental violations are a problem with 
the system and seeking the solutions that will work best in the real world wherever SSAs may be 
implemented. It is not productive to attempt to assign blame for this problem and to shift 
responsibility for solving it on one party or another. The ultimate solutions will require efforts by 
government service and regulatory agencies, the research community, industry, and pilots 
themselves.   
The interventions proposed here are derived from a working knowledge of the aviation domain 
and an understanding of the probable causes for SSA violations as found by Zuschlag (2005). No 
attempt has been made to evaluate the present or alternative approaches to securing potential 
terrorist targets from attacks from the air. It is conceivable that equal security can be effected 
through alternatives to applying the current types of SSAs –alternatives that may be associated 
with a substantially lower cost to the aviation community and the nation as a whole. However, the 
search for such alternatives, if they exist, is beyond the scope of this report. The interventions for 
this report assume that the national interest is best served by applying SSAs of the current type, 
size, frequency, and duration. 
The vast majority of violations of SSAs are made in small aircraft, usually a piston-powered 
single (Zuschlag, 2005). This implies that the most effective interventions are those that target the 
low-end general aviation private pilot, presumably flying under Visual Flying Rules (VFR). Such 
pilots do not have the resources to support his or her flying that a commercial or military pilot 
has. This implies that for an intervention to be most effective, it should, from the pilot's point of 
view, have the following attributes: 
 Low cost. 
 Low training requirements. 
 Not reliant on instrument flying skills. 
 Low workload. 
Low workload is especially important while airborne as typically such aircraft are operated by a 
single pilot. As an additional consideration of available resources, while advanced graphics-
capable multi-function displays are making their way into the general aviation cockpit, such 
technology cannot be assumed to be available to all pilots in the next decade or so. Indeed, it 
should be assumed that there will always be a population of aircraft that do not have in-panel 
digital cockpit systems, or even electrical systems. Interventions should not depend on such 
systems. 
There are also human factors considerations to any intervention. The intervention should be 
consistent with current flight concepts and practices so that existing knowledge and ingrained 
habits result in fewer violations rather than more. The intervention should be readily integrated 
into normal procedures and routines. The easier it is for pilots to include actions to avoid 
violations, the more likely they will take those actions. The more such actions disrupt flight tasks 
or conflict with flight goals, the less likely pilots will take them. Relatedly, the intervention 
should avoid requiring pilot actions that must be done specifically to avoid SSAs (e.g., checking 
an information source dedicated to SSAs before each flight). While pilots who are flying near 
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static or frequently recurrent SSAs may be motivated to perform such actions, other pilots may 
not because a SSA is not expected. The intervention should be designed such that pilots naturally 
develop awareness and understanding of a SSA through their pursuit of the normal goals and 
tasks associated with flight (e.g., preflight preparation, navigating, avoiding weather, 
communicating). This is not to imply that pilots should not be responsible for being fully aware 
of the airspace they transit. It does, however, recognize that realistically many pilots are going to 
be less motivated to regularly carry out any extra work necessary for checking for SSAs given the 
low probability of a transitory SSA for a particular region at a particular time. Finally, the 
information provided through the intervention should be functionally trustworthy and useful. If 
the information source is found to be inaccurate (e.g., frequently causing false alarms) or not 
useful for avoiding SSAs, pilots will soon ignore it. 
4. Short-term Interventions 
Short-term interventions are those that can be accomplished without the development and 
deployment of new hardware, either to cockpits or to ground facilities such as air traffic control 
centers. In other words, these interventions are limited to procedure and policy changes, changes 
to information content, format, or medium, or, at most, software changes. Some of these 
interventions could be carried out by private industry using materials as it is currently distributed 
by the FAA, while other interventions may be better carried out by the FAA itself, perhaps as part 
of current programs to improve information dissemination, such as NAIMES.  
As shown in Table 1, most violations of SSAs can be attributed to lack of information about 
SSAs, the chief information being (1) the relative distance to SSA, (2) the simple presence of the 
SSA, and (3) the procedures for allowed penetration of SSA. Short-term solutions are broken 
down by the primary information deficiency they address, beginning with knowing the presence 
of the SSA.  
4.1. Improving Pilot Awareness of the Presence of SSAs 
Failure to recognize the existence of a SSA is not the single most important cause of SSA 
violations, but maximizing the number of pilots in an area that recognize the presence of a SSA is 
still the first step to reducing violations of it, thus interventions to maximize awareness are 
discussed first. 
Currently, the activation of a transitory and recurrent SSA is announced through a NOTAM. 
Thus, knowledge of the presence of such a SSA activation can be improved by increasing the 
likelihood of the pilot seeing the associated NOTAM. A typical preflight task includes using 
electronic preflight briefing services such as DUATS to receive a report on the weather and 
NOTAMs in the vicinity of the flight path as indicated by the flight plan provided by the pilot. An 
intervention to improve awareness of the SSA's NOTAM would best focus on improving this 
briefing report, rather than, say, developing other SSA-specific sources of the NOTAM, which 
would require pilot action specific to avoiding SSAs. 
4.1.1. Sorting, Filtering, or Highlighting Briefing Reports 
The briefing report can be improved to increase SSA awareness without sacrificing awareness of 
other important information through better sorting, filtering, or highlighting of its contents. 
Currently, NOTAMs appear at the end of the report, sorted broadly by source; SSA NOTAMs are 
at the end intermixed with numerous other NOTAMs from the National Flight Data Center. The 
FAA can support better sorting, filtering, and highlighting by including in each NOTAM standard 
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keywords that allow software to identify the type and relevance of the NOTAM. Keywords can 
be used to encode:  
 Class and identity of object NOTAM relates to (e.g., runway, navaid, airspace). 
 Class of action related to object (e.g., name change, frequency change, restriction). 
 Type of flight or aircraft that the NOTAM is most relevant to. 
Further research by a government agency is necessary to determine the information to encode and 
the keywords to be used. Ultimately or alternatively to the keyword approach, the FAA could 
encode and transmit NOTAM information as named database fields, although this would require 
addition government research and development to convert the system to support formatting or 
markup. 
By using such keywords, or by using its own methods for categorizing NOTAMs, services such 
as DUATS can then provide more sophisticated filtering, sorting, or highlighting of NOTAMs 
within briefing reports for the given flight path or region to reflect the priority and proximity of 
the NOTAM. For many pilots, NOTAMs of proximal SSAs are the single most important type of 
NOTAM, so these should be listed first or highlighted (e.g., with additional delimiters such as a 
border of asterisks). The lowest priority is NOTAMs that simply announce the cancellation of 
other NOTAMs. These can be filtered out and presented separately, perhaps only with explicit 
pilot request. Apparently, it is technically feasible for a computer program to successfully extract 
the SSA shape and location from most NOTAMs. With this done, the briefing report can display 
a prominent alert at the top of briefing if the pilot-entered flight plan directly conflicts with a 
SSA.  
With sufficient information encoded in the NOTAMs, perhaps all NOTAMs may be sorted by 
likelihood that the pilot will encounter the element related to the NOTAM given the flight plan 
submitted by the pilot. Top priority for the pilot to view would be applied to NOTAMs for 
airports the aircraft lands at or takes off from, airways on the path, and airspace the given path 
passes through, the latter including any relevant SSA NOTAMs. Possibly the entire briefing 
report can be sorted by such criteria, with weather conditions, forecasts, and NOTAMs likely to 
be encountered all intermixed and sorted in the geographic order of the flight. Other weather and 
NOTAMs (the bulk of the report) would be presented separately. Currently the briefing report is 
sorted by the source of the information –first all Meteorological Reports (surface observations) 
presented together, then all airborne pilot reports, then radar summaries, then terminal forecasts, 
(etc.).   
NOTAMs could also be categorized and subsequently filtered by characteristics of the flight. For 
example, NOTAMs primarily relevant to IFR flight can be separated from those primarily 
relevant to VFR flight. Additional study of NOTAMs and how they affect flight may identify 
other dimensions for categorization that discriminate the NOTAMs' relevance for different pilots, 
aircraft, or types of flights. NOTAMS for Control Level 1 SSAs would be relevant to all aircraft 
and always have high priority, but with other irrelevant NOTAMs separated, they will be easier to 
spot. 
While most recommendations here focused on printed or electronic briefings, many pilots are 
briefed through FSS. FSS controllers as a rule are highly professional and competent, but there 
are nonetheless cases of pilots failing to be aware of active SSAs after being briefed by FSS 
(Zuschlag, 2005). Such failures to communicate may be due to the antiquated technology used by 
FSSs. At the very least, all FSS stations should have technology to detect a potential SSA conflict 
based on the flight plan supplied by the pilot. Better sorting and filtering of NOTAMs for the FSS 
controller will have similar benefits as it can have for pilots. Ideally, to assist cases when FSS is 
  
 
 14
contacted by an airborne pilot, FSS workstations could display the current position of the aircraft 
on maps depicting the SSA, perhaps based on a feed from ATC, allowing the briefer to give more 
precise advice for avoiding the SSA. The FAA has most of these capabilities in the form of 
OASIS and the Special Use Airspace/Inflight Service Enhancement (SUA/ISE) system, but their 
availability has been limited (Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration and the 
Aviation Programs, 2003), suggesting that funding and the application of policy is the primary 
obstacle. Considering the high frequency of SSA violations, the availability of these technologies, 
if anything, should be accelerated. 
4.1.2. Formatting of NOTAMs in Briefing Reports 
Spotting relevant NOTAMs such as those for SSAs is inhibited by the single-styled free-text 
format of the NOTAMs. Text is shown in all capital letters (as shown in Figure 1), making it 
difficult for the pilot to skim for key words. Use of proper sentence case would substantially 
improve matters. The FAA could make formatted NOTAMs available to briefing services, 
perhaps utilizing HTML for easy distribution and cross-platform compatibility. Varying text 
weight and size can be used to highlight and distinguish information key to help pilots determine 
the type and relevance of the NOTAM. Other details within the NOTAM should remain in 
normal font. Paragraph breaks for long NOTAMs should be by blocks of related content 
(currently, breaks appear to be arbitrary, possibly by the number of characters). A mockup of the 
heading of such a NOTAM is shown in Figure 4. As shown in Figure 4 and in contrast with the 
beginning text in Figure 1, the basic type of NOTAM, along with basic location and activation 
date of the SSAs should be prominently shown to catch immediate attention. Other fields in the 
header (e.g., miles from flight plan) could represent the NOTAMs relevance as determined 
dynamically from the flight information provided by the pilot.  
Even better would be to break down each NOTAM of any appreciable complexity (such as a SSA 
NOTAM) into tabular or form fields arranged in a standard geometry for each kind of NOTAM. 
AOPA and DUATS do this to SSA NOTAMs, but separately from the briefing report, requiring 
pilots to anticipate the potential for a SSA activation and seek that information elsewhere. Such 
formatting should be applied to all complex NOTAMs within the briefing report to aid the pilot in 
skimming the report for relevant NOTAMs. With practice, the very geometry of the NOTAM 
fields will cue the pilot to the type of NOTAM. The DUATS and AOPA formats may be studied 
as possible alternatives. Another alternative is discussed in Section 4.2.4. The ultimate format 
should be subjected to study with actual pilot populations to validate its effectiveness. 
Formatted and arranged text can be supplemented by including icons or graphics to redundantly 
identify the NOTAM’s attributes, where graphics are easier to recognize at a glance than words. 
It is not necessary for the icons to be immediately interpretable in isolation because attribute 
labels are also provided. Rather, the icons merely have to be easy to learn and remember, and, 
more importantly, easy to distinguish from one another as the pilot scans the report. IMAPS 
AeroPlanner makes limited use of icons in this capacity. 
 FDC 5/1953. Located 8 nm from flight plan. High relevance for Any Flight. 
Flight Restrictions  
Pensacola, FL, March 18 2005, 7:50 – 12:05 local 
 
Figure 4. Mockup of heading for NOTAM 5/1953 (see Figure 1) using variable font weight 
and size to aid scanning. This would be followed by the content of the NOTAM in smaller font 
using mixed case (see Appendix, Page 54). 
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4.1.3. Other Possible Improvements for Briefing Reports 
There are a number of other possible improvements one could make to briefing reports. The exact 
format and effectiveness of each may be subjects of future research. 
In addition to improving sorting and formatting of NOTAMs within an electronic preflight 
briefing report, the electronic briefing service could include at the beginning a flight plan specific 
summary of the most critical information. This may be a dynamically generated map of the flight 
plan prominently displaying active SSAs as well as threatening weather, laser activity, moored 
balloons, smoke, and other hazards. Less critical information (e.g., frequency changes) may be 
more discretely represented. Links or cross references from the map access additional details 
(e.g., the associated NOTAM). As pilots get into the habit of first quickly checking the summary 
for any hazards, those who may not be expecting the activation of a SSA will nonetheless become 
informed.  
The briefing or the NOTAM itself can also indicate when a NOTAM for an object such as a SSA 
has been updated or corrected, including the date and time of the updating and highlighting the 
changes. This will cover cases of pilots erroneously dismissing certain NOTAMs as being 
functionally the same as prior familiar NOTAMs.  
For Restricted Area SUA that do not have a regular schedule that can be documented on charts 
(as is done now), the FAA could begin supplying NOTAMs to announce their activation. The 
same can be done for when the control level of a NSA is raised. This will help get pilots in the 
habit of referring to the NOTAMs in a briefing report for all recurrent or transitory airspace 
restrictions. Regularly checking for a SUA activation, the pilot is more likely to see a transitory 
SSA activation. 
Electronic briefing services or the FAA can develop a feature to support personalized update 
briefings. When delivering a standard briefing to a pilot, the username, timestamp, and flight plan 
is stored until some time after the pilot-provided end time of the flight. Pilots calling up the same 
flight plan (and possibly editing it) are then supplied with only new weather and NOTAMs given 
the current time and any flight plan changes. This will encourage pilots to check back with 
briefing services, perhaps while airborne, to see if anything significant has changed (e.g., a 
change in SSA activation) 6. The system may even automatically phone the pilot if there are 
significant changes from original standard briefing. 
4.1.4. Charting Recurrent and Static SSAs 
Along with various weather information products, navigation charts are a key source of 
aeronautical information that is frequently used by pilots. It is natural to map static and recurrent 
SSAs on charts such as sectionals, terminal area charts, and IFR en route charts, which already 
show SUAs, the cousins to SSAs. By placing SSAs on such regularly referenced charts, pilots are 
much more likely to be aware of the presence. For a recurrent SSA, this awareness will encourage 
pilots to regularly scan for a NOTAM indicating the SSA’s activation. To maximize the chance of 
this behavior, static SSAs need to be distinct from recurrent SSAs (parallel to what is done for 
Prohibited and Restricted SUAs), and the SSA needs to be clearly and consistently identified on 
both the chart and the header of the NOTAM. 
As mentioned earlier, some efforts have already been made to chart such SSAs. However, up-to-
date representations of these SSAs have been delayed, leading to confusion. If charts are to be 
                                                          
6 Presidential TFRs typically warn pilots to “check NOTAMs frequently for possible required changes” 
(see Figure 1) 
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effectively used to raise pilots’ awareness of SSAs, then the process for adding and changing 
SSAs on charts needs to be streamlined. Otherwise, pilots may soon fail to trust and to use such 
information. Possibly, an agency can assist the FAA in studying the current process and 
proposing affordable improvements. Among the first steps to address this is to formalize the 
definition of “recurrent” or “static” SSA (e.g., by anticipated number of activations per year or 
activation duration) in order to identify the sort of SSAs that are candidates for charting and set 
the requirements for a revised system for charting SSAs. 
4.1.5. Weather Products and Other Channels 
While much can be done to increase awareness of SSAs by improving the current primary means 
of disseminating SSA information, awareness can also be improved by opening new channels to 
communicate the presence of SSAs. The task of determining the actual implementation (e.g., how 
to feed the data) requires further study. 
For the VFR pilot, perhaps the most important and frequently needed information from outside 
sources is weather. If a pilot does any preflight preparation at all, chances are it involves a check 
of the weather. The preflight briefing provides extensive weather information along with 
NOTAMs. However, a less than fully conscientious pilot may forgo a full standard briefing for 
short or simple flights (e.g., pattern work around the airport), and instead gather only key weather 
information. Accidental violations by such pilots can be reduced by including recurrent and 
transitory SSA activation alerts with local weather information products. As an alerting 
mechanism, it is not necessary to include any details about the SSA. It can merely serve to get the 
pilot’s attention and direct him or her to an appropriate source of the details.  
Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) weather summaries can include SSA activation alerts, 
as can the pre-recorded weather summaries accessible through the Telephone Information 
Briefing Service (TIBS). Meteorological Reports (METARs) and Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts 
(TAFs) in particular make good products to include SSA activation alerts. METARs include a 
Remarks portion that may be suited for this. In keeping with the terse system of abbreviations 
found in such products, the key text “TFR” followed by the associated NOTAM number may be 
sufficient (see Figure 5). Consistent with the functions of METARs and TAFs, a METAR may be 
used if the SSA is currently active at that location, while a TAF may be used if a SSA 
encompassing that location will activate in the next 24 hours. 
 METAR KPNS 181353Z VRB05KT 10SM FEW011 SCT043 09/06 A3004 RMK 
AO2 SLP177 T00890056 TFR5/1953 
Pensacola FL [KPNS] hourly observation on the 18th at 8:53am EST (1353Z)  
Wind variable at 5 knots, visibility 10 miles, 1,100 feet few, 4,300 feet scattered, temperature 
9°C (48°F), dewpoint 6°C (43°F), altimeter 30.04, automated station with precipitation 
discriminator, sea level pressure 30.05" Hg (1017.7 hPa), temperature 8.9°C (48.0°F), 
dewpoint 5.6°C (42.1°F), TFR in effect see NOTAM 5/1953. 
 
Figure 5. Mockup of a METAR with inclusion of a TFR alert, both in coded form and as it 
would appear in a DUATS plain-text “translation.” 
Some airports are already putting SSA activation alerts on their ATIS broadcasts, which are 
frequently checked by pilots before takeoff and as they approach their destination. Including such 
alerts make it possible for even airborne pilots to learn of the presence of an active SSA, 
including a SSA that changed after takeoff. This practice should be extended and standardized to 
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all airports providing ATIS broadcasts. The Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS) may 
also be reprogrammed to allow the inclusion of such alerts. Alerts may also be included in other 
airborne weather information services such as Transcribed Weather Broadcasts (TWEB) and the 
Hazardous In-flight Weather Advisory Service (HIWAS). The frequency of local FSS can be 
included in the alert to allow the airborne pilot to get the details of the SSA activation. 
The FAA could provide fixed-based operators (FBOs) at airports and even individual pilots with 
alerts of the activation of SSAs through automatic faxes or email, similar to the services provided 
by private organizations. FBOs may be allowed to sign up for receiving standard-formatted large-
print notice that may be posted for pilots to see before flight.  
4.1.6. Specific Times and Places for All TFRs 
Historically, the FAA has imposed multiple SSAs through a single “blanket” NOTAM, which 
declare SSAs over all instances of a particular class of potential targets, rather than over an 
individual location. One such NOTAM currently in effect (FAA, 2003d), declares Control Level 
1 SSAs over any major populated stadium and sporting event. It is left to the pilot to determine 
where these events occur and when they are scheduled. Another NOTAM (FAA, 2004f) 
essentially declares Control Level 3 SSAs over all "military facilities" and "industrial 
complexes," among other structures, without defining these terms or the size or shape of the 
respective SSAs. While these are "only" at Control Level 3, it is nonetheless important for pilots 
to avoid these areas. This is especially so for nuclear power stations given a plane deemed 
threatening might be shot down (AOPA, 2005b). Few violations are associated with the SSAs 
covered by blanket NOTAMs. However, it remains a questionable expectation for pilots to keep 
clear of such SSAs while not providing sufficient information to do so.  
At a minimum, all such SSAs should be charted so the locations are known to pilots. There are 
then two alternatives to handle the time element, where different stadiums or sports events may 
use one or the other alternative dependent on the threat and vulnerability. Firstly, if it affords an 
acceptable level of security, a static Control Level 3 SSA could be placed over the stadium. Text 
(perhaps on the chart itself) should tell pilots that it is especially important to remain clear of the 
stadium when they are populated. Pilots may still stray over stadium events, but at least they will 
usually see that the stadium is populated (by the cars in the parking lot, if nothing else), and can 
promptly leave the area.  
Secondly, the FAA can establish recurrent Control Level 1 SSAs over certain high-risk stadiums, 
and announce each SSA activation through the usual channels. Given that events are scheduled 
well in advanced, a single NOTAM can cover a month or even a season's worth of activations for 
a particular stadium. The goal is to be able to provide in a briefing all the information necessary 
for the pilot to definitively determine if the airspace may or may not be flown. This alternative 
implies that event organizers should be required by law to inform federal authorities of their 
schedules. This would seem to be an appropriate obligation if such a level of control is truly 
necessary. In addition to providing the FAA with the information necessary to distribute an 
appropriate NOTAM, other federal agencies need the schedule in order to provided adequate 
security (e.g., having interceptors ready to stop an actual terrorist attack). 
4.2. Improving Pilot Awareness of SSA Boundaries 
The single most important cause of violations of SSAs is the pilot not being aware of the SSA’s 
position relative to the pilot’s aircraft. All interventions to this cause of violations focus on better 
communicating the boundaries of the SSA to the pilot.  
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4.2.1. Charting SSAs 
Through NOTAMs and FSS briefings, SSA boundary information is currently represented in 
words, usually as a radius from geographic coordinates or a radial and distance from a navigation 
aid (see Figure 1). However, a pilot cannot take these words alone and form an accurate mental 
representation of the airspace. Only by taking the words and plotting the SSA on a map can any 
reliable sense of the boundaries by understood. Forcing pilots to manually plot a SSA from a text 
description provides an opportunity for errors in transcription and interpretation of the NOTAM. 
Furthermore, a pilot may elect to not do the extra labor to plot a certain SSA, believing it is not 
relevant, only for it to become relevant due to changes in plans after airborne (e.g., due to 
unpredicted weather). 
It thus makes sense to plot the SSA for the pilot, and it has already been recommended that static 
and recurrent SSAs be on all appropriate charts. This process appears to be already underway, but 
the efficiency of the process needs to be improved to ensure the SSA representations are timely 
and accurate. The goal should be to have the capacity to add or remove a SSA within a single 
update cycle of the chart. Ideally, unless there is an especially urgent security consideration, a 
recurrent or static SSA should not be imposed until it can appear on charts. 
The charting of the boundaries of static and recurrent SSAs should include SSAs associated with 
military facilities, industrial infrastructure, stadiums and other areas currently covered by 
“blanket” NOTAMs (the former two currently being Control Level 3 SSAs). Even transitory 
SSAs could be mapped if they are known with sufficient lead time and will be active for a 
substantial portion of the chart edition’s lifetime (e.g., that associated with a major event such as 
the Olympics). When possible, the FAA should use existing SUA types and associated 
symbology (e.g., Prohibited Areas, Restricted Areas, and NSAs) since these are already relatively 
familiar to pilots and well documented. However, it may be necessary to define new types of 
airspace corresponding to certain control levels and degrees of stability, and develop associated 
symbology. This is a topic for additional research. It is probably a good practice to state the SSA 
identity and boundaries on the chart (i.e., providing its name, diameter, and ceiling) so the pilot 
can cross-check it against notices concerning other SSAs. This will reduce the chance of a pilot 
confusing a NOTAM instantiating a new SSA with an existing SSA depicted on the chart, as has 
occurred in the past (Zuschlag, 2005). 
4.2.2. Optimally Detailed Maps 
For maps of transitory SSAs, the best solution is to provide them through electronic distribution, 
as is done by the FAA on their TFR web site, but, as discussed earlier, not all SSAs are mapped, 
and, if they are, often the maps lack the optimal level of detail (see Figure 2). Private 
organizations such as DUATS, AOPA, and IMAPS likewise use maps that are not optimized for 
the purpose of communicating the position and boundaries of a SSA. The map should be 
sufficiently detailed to allow a pilot unfamiliar with the area to precisely identify each SSA and 
draw each on a sectional or other chart, but not so detailed that text or symbols are difficult to 
read when printed in black and white or viewed at the level of zoom necessary to show the entire 
SSA. A proposed map design should be experimentally tested on pilots to verify that the design 
meets this criterion. 
In general, this means the details should be at a level comparable to that found on a sectional, 
using symbology consistent with a sectional chart. At the same time a simple unmodified scan of 
a sectional or other chart is not necessarily desirable. The details of such a scan may not be 
readable in a computer image at certain levels of scale and may produce difficult to read printouts 
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in any case (see Figure 3). Also, information on the scanned sectional can conflict with NOTAM. 
For example, superimposing the current Disney World Control Level 1 SSA (2003e) on a 
sectional places it proximal to an existing legend advising pilots to "avoid" flying over Disney 
World, suggesting the SSA is only at Control Level 3. 
 
Figure 6. Mockup of a map for NOTAM 5/1953 (see Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3) 
attempting to optimize the level of detail necessary to communicate key SSA information. 
Labels for each SSA (Areas 1, 2, and 3) cross-reference the pilot to additional information (see 
Appendix, Page 54).  
Research involving actual pilots should ultimately determine the selection of details to be 
incorporated on such maps. Among the potential details that a map of a SSA should include are 
the following (see example in Figure 6): 
 Ground references such as those found on a sectional chart. In addition to airports and bodies 
of water shown in most existing SSA maps, this should include cities and towns, major roads, 
rail lines, power lines, bridges, and other landmarks. In addition to the coastline, Figure 6 
depicts and labels four cities and three major highways, along with an unlabeled rail line. 
Such ground references allows the pilot to visualize the SSA boundary in the view out the 
aircraft window, so she or he can use pilotage to avoid the SSA. Like FAA maps, AOPA 
maps (which appear to be using Jeppesen products) are short on such surface details. 
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 All fixes useful for locating the SSA boundaries. This includes, but is generally not limited to, 
the navigation aid referenced in the NOTAM to locate the center of the SSA. Including 
multiple fixes helps the pilot plan the use of electronic navigation to avoid the SSA (e.g., by 
flying a particular radial, or heading to a fix stored in the aircraft’s GPS database). Figure 6 
depicts VHF omnidirectional ranges (VORs) and non-directional beacons (NDBs), along with 
reporting points using nearly standard symbols. Most DUATS and some AeroPlanner maps at 
least show navigation aids, but only AOPA shows additional fixes that may be useful to 
pilots. 
 Other airspace, especially Class B and C, and certain SUAs, along with any Mode C veil. 
Figure 6, for example, shows the Class C airspace around the three major airports in the 
center of the map, along with the US ADIZ along the south edge (numerous SUAs are not 
shown). Pilots are already used to avoiding such airspace. Being able to reference the SSA to 
such airspace allows the pilot to better understand its boundaries and may guide a strategy to 
avoid the airspace (e.g., stay out of the Mode C veil, which encompasses the entire SSA). 
Many GPS moving map displays display this airspace, allowing the pilot to monitor his or her 
position to the SSA while in flight. Showing Class E airspace boundaries, in contrast, will not 
provide this function and should be suppressed to minimize clutter. 
 Latitude and longitude graticule. Figure 6, for example, shows latitude and longitude in 20-
minute increments. In addition to providing general cartographic orientation and sense of 
scale, a graticule allows pilots with GPS hardware to create waypoints to navigate around the 
SSA. 
 State and national borders. Figure 6, for example, depicts the Florida-Alabama border. Like 
coastlines, this provides a general orientation and a sense of scale. 
It is probably better to not show terrain, as can happen when raster scanned maps are used, 
especially if the terrain altitude is color-coded as done on sectionals. This will tend to add 
excessive clutter and reduce the contrast of other map elements (especially when printed on a 
black and white printer), while providing little benefit. Stylized representations of significant 
terrain features (e.g., significant mountains and ridges as done on some approach charts) may be 
considered as these may help the pilot understand the boundaries of the SSA. 
In addition to surface references, the map should display the ceiling of each SSA shown, perhaps 
in the same manner as used for Class D airspace on sectionals. Figure 6 provides an alternative 
means to show this information that avoids the clutter that is often found at the center of a SSA 
(which are typically over urban and airport areas). Effective times of the SSA’s activation should 
also be indicated (as shown in Figure 6) so that the map provides the temporal as well as 
geographic boundaries of the SSA activation. Text or symbology should be used to distinguish 
the general level of control of the SSA. In Figure 6, for example, symbology based on that for 
charting Restricted Areas is used for the two smaller Control Level 1 SSAs in 5/1953, while 
symbology based on that for the ADIZ is used for the larger Control Level 2 SSA. In other words, 
all the key information from the NOTAM should be represented in the map. The map may even 
include a text caption summarizing the airspace with sufficient detail to allow it to be precisely 
drawn (i.e., radius and center position). A reference or hypertext link should exist between the 
map and the associated NOTAM or other SSA text representation, perhaps between map and the 
correct location in the preflight briefing. 
4.2.3. Improved Map Readability and Understandability 
Related to optimizing the map details is maximizing map readability and understandability. As 
discussed above, excessive information can clutter a map. However, even with a fixed amount of 
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information to place on a map, the choice of scale and symbology impacts the capacity of the 
pilot to read and correctly understand the information on the map. SSA maps from AOPA ’s web 
site, for example, eschew the use of raster scanned sectionals to provide a less cluttered map. 
However, the map size and scale selected nonetheless tends to make the map difficult to read. 
A map scale of miles (bottom right of Figure 6) is often lacking on current SSA maps but is 
important for judging the size of the SSA and choosing references for navigating around the SSA 
(i.e., ones that are not too close to the boundary). Dynamically scaled maps, such as those shown 
on the computer screen should always show a scale of miles. Map orientation should always be 
with true north at the top to allow easier cross-referencing with charts. The FAA maps sometimes 
have direction of north at less than perfectly vertical (true north is approximately 6 degrees 
counterclockwise from vertical in Figure 2). 
It may be necessary to adjust map characteristics for the medium of display. For display on a 
computer monitor display, map images must be created with the consideration that computer 
monitors have substantially smaller sizes and lower resolutions (dots per inch) than a printed 
sectional. Very large scaling is necessary to read a scanned aeronautical chart, making it difficult 
to appraise the overall boundaries of the SSA. Electronic maps can be more effective through 
application of different font size, symbol representation, and color usage from printed maps, 
while still remaining generally consistent aeronautical charting conventions (e.g., Society of 
Automotive Engineers, 1997; International Civil Aviation Organization, 2001; Radio Technical 
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), 2003). Private organizations currently display electronic 
SSA maps only at a small “lowest common denominator” size, generally less than 640x380 
pixels, but most users have larger monitors than can ease the resolution problem. Thus, in 
addition to allowing the user to select the scale of such dynamic maps, the user should be able to 
set the map size to make best use of his or her display’s capability.  
The same map image used for display on the monitor may not be adequate for a printout. Most 
printers can print at resolution approaching a sectional, and printing a low-resolution map for 
monitors will fail to capitalize on this. With their higher resolution, printed maps can be made 
easier to read and more faithful to charting conventions for symbol shape. However, unlike for 
monitors, it cannot be assumed that the user has access to a color printer. Printed maps should 
work well in black and white, and color should not be the sole source of coding information. 
Printouts of the map are best printed at one of the standard scales used by aeronautical charts 
(e.g.,1:500,000, 1:250,000), making it easy for pilots to cross reference the map to official charts. 
Ultimately, it may be advantageous to supply two sources of maps, as done by AeroPlanner, 
dynamic maps for screen display and fixed-scale documents (e.g., as PDF (Portable Document 
Format) files) for printing. 
4.2.4. Standardize and Improve Text Descriptions 
While a map of the SSA is the best way to communicate the location and boundaries of the SSA, 
benefits can also be had by improving the text descriptions of the boundaries as provided in the 
NOTAM for the SSA. As discussed in Section 4.1.2, breaking up the SSA NOTAM and 
reformatting it will make it easier for pilots to recognize the relevance of a NOTAM when 
scanning through a preflight briefing report. Such restructuring can also make the NOTAM easier 
to understand once it is identified as relevant by representing the configuration of the SSA in the 
use of emphasis and the geometric arrangement of the information. This also makes it easier to 
pick out the boundary information at a glance when the pilot references the NOTAM. The 
arrangement of information should be such that the pilot can quickly draw the SSA on a chart, or 
enter it into a GPS moving map system. It should be recognized that the reading conditions may 
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be substantially suboptimal (e.g., done while in flight with poor lighting, turbulence, and other 
tasks competing for attention). 
The FAA could help this process by considering standardizing and simplifying the shapes of 
transitory SSAs, so that a standard format of boundary information can be adhered to. Because 
recurrent and static SSAs should be charted as recommended in Sections 4.1.4 and 4.2.1 
(preferably before the SSA becomes active), these SSAs may have a more irregular shape that 
better balances airspace access and security concerns. Transitory SSAs, being by definition short-
lived can afford less optimized boundaries for the sake of easier understanding by pilots, although 
exceptions from a standard shape must also be allowed for. For example, the US cannot legally 
impose a SSA over foreign airspace. A SSA centered on a point near the Mexican or Canadian 
border will need a “cutout.” The most convenient shape for pilots may be a circle of a given 
radius centered on a specified point, which describes most transitory SSAs currently imposed, but 
not necessarily all (Burnside, 2004). If a circular SSA happens to be centered on a distance 
measure equipment (DME) facility, a pilot can use the DME to keep clear of the SSA. For a more 
arbitrary point, many GPS systems will provide pilots with a continuous in-flight readout of the 
distance to a pilot-entered point.  
As stated earlier, the ultimate format of a NOTAM should be determined through systematic 
study with actual pilot populations. However, one approach to structuring SSA text information 
for pilots is illustrated in Figure 7. This can be compared with the approaches taken by private 
organizations such as DUATS and AOPA. 
As shown in Figure 7, each SSA activation within the NOTAM is presented tabularly as a 
separate column, arranged chronologically from left to right. Reference numbers for each SSA 
are provided in the top row to match the text to a mapped depiction of the SSAs (as in Figure 6; 
see Page 54 in the appendix for a consolidated mockup), which, for a hypertext medium, may be 
linked (represented by underlining in Figure 7). A Restrictions field includes a number that would 
refer the pilot (possibly by linking) to the basic rules for operating within the SSA. As is done in 
current NOTAMs, the position of each SSA is given both as latitude and longitude and as a 
position relative to a proximal navigation fix in order to maximize the ease and accuracy of 
manual entry of the position into various vendors’ GPS units. 
Additional characteristics of the NOTAM text can also improve a pilot’s ability to avoid 
accidentally crossing the boundaries of a SSA. The position of a SSA should always be given 
relative to a major navigation fix identifiable on nearly all charts, (e.g., using a radial and distance 
to indicate the center of a circular SSA). It should never be a location that cannot be relied on to 
be on charts or in a GPS database (e.g., the actual building or place the SSA is intended to 
protect). 
The SSA’s ceiling should always be provided as altitude above mean sea level (MSL), since even 
aircraft with minimal instrumentation will feature a barometric altimeter. Currently some SSA 
ceilings are specified in MSL, while others in height above ground, the latter which may lead to 
confusion as well as difficulty translating it into usable dimension (most single-engine piston 
aircraft do not have a radar altimeter). 
“Legalese” language and other text that is not relevant to understanding the functional impact of 
the NOTAM should be eliminated or de-emphasized. Referencing the federal regulation that 
justifies the imposition of the SSA (as in Figure 1) does not help a pilot understand it. 
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Map Reference  Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Area 2 
Restrictions 2 1 
Location Lat 
Long 
30 28 24 N 
087 11 15 W 
30 21 10 N 
087 19 01W 
30 28 24 N 
087 11 15 W 
30 21 10 N 
087 19 01W 
 Fix CEW 228 033.7 BFM 108 041.3 CEW 228 033.7 BFM 108 041.3 
Radius  30 nm* 10 nm 
Ceiling MSL FL 180 
Time  Zulu 05 03 18 1350 
05 03 18 1805 
05 03 18 1350 
05 03 18 1455 
05 03 18 1415  
05 03 18 1640 
05 03 18 1600 
05 03 18 1805 
 Local 0750 03/18/05 
1205 03/18/05 
0750 03/18/05 
0855 03/18/05 
0815 03/18/05 
1040 03/18/05 
1000 03/18/05 
1205 03/18/05 
Duration  4:15 hrs 1:05 hrs 2:25 hrs 2:05 hrs 
Public Airports within 1J9 
2R4 
5R4 
82J 
83J 
JKA 
NPA 
NSE 
PNS 
82J 
83J 
NPA 
82J 
83J 
NPA 
PNS 
82J 
83J 
NPA 
*Excluding airspace overlapping with Areas 2 and 3 during their respective active times. 
Figure 7. Mockup of SSA text boundary information in a tabular format for 5/1953 for better 
reference and readability (compare to Figure 1). 
IMAPS’s AeroPlanner and the AOPA web site for SSAs include with each NOTAM an 
alphabetized list all airports affected by the NOTAM, although not all specify which SSA affects 
each airport for NOTAMs that declare multiple SSAs (as done in Figure 7). In any case, such a 
list is useful to pilots. While airports are shown on the map depictions of SSAs, pilots looking for 
the impact on a specific airport can more quickly find this information in this tabular format. 
However the NOTAM text is formatted, electronic text representations should be suited for 
printing. Currently for some printers, the right margin gets cropped on the NOTAMs given on the 
FAA’s web site, and the tabular “highlights” summary on the DUATS web site. 
4.2.5. Additional Measures to Improve Boundary Understanding 
The above changes will help pilots who gather preflight briefing information from electronic 
sources. However, pilots may also use FSS for a briefing, where essentially visual information 
(the position and shape of a SSA) is once again transmitted verbally. FSS briefer should have the 
ability to easily fax or email SSA information (e.g., directly from the briefer's computer 
workstation), especially the map depiction, to pilots on request to aid pilots in understanding the 
controllers’ recommendations and possibly to prompt pilots on questions to ask. This actually 
would be a valuable capability for any NOTAM, cutting down the potential for transcription 
errors. 
Vendors of GPS navigate system software can build on the existing capability to allow pilot-
defined fixes, as discussed earlier, and develop a feature that helps alert pilots of an approaching 
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transitory SSA. After the pilot enters a fix and distance (and possibly a time interval as well), the 
GPS will alert the pilot with visual and/or auditory singal if the aircraft comes close to the given 
distance from the fix. It can even cue the pilot on which turn would best avoid the airspace. A 
more advanced variation of this feature is discussed in Section 5. It may be desirable for a 
government research agency to prototype such a feature in order to spur industry to develop and 
market it. 
The recommendations given in 4.2.4 focused on maximizing the readability of SSA information 
by humans. The FAA can ultimately reduce the number of violations of SSAs by also providing a 
version of SSA information that is easily readable by machines. This is a separate source of 
electronically distributed SSA activation information from NOTAMs, and is far beyond including 
keywords, as detailed as a stopgap measure in Section 4.1.1. Rather, this is a source of 
information intended solely for mechanized digital processing by electronic briefing services and 
vendors of GPS databases (although the direct use by properly equipped private individuals is 
also a definite possibility). Developing such a standardized format requires research by 
government, perhaps aided by industry standards organizations, to ensure the resulting format is 
usable by current and future vendors of such services and products. 
In distributing SSA information in an appropriate standardized machine-readable file format, 
requesting agencies can automatically plot any SSA on electronic and dynamically generated 
maps. GPS database vendors can alert their customers of updates that include new SSAs, 
allowing them to download the update to their cockpit GPS systems. With this feature, even 
transitory SSAs can be displayed on a moving map display, and an automated alert system can 
notify pilots if they are approaching a SSA. Ideally, the transfer of SSA information should be 
fast and compatible with automated downloading and processing in order to maximize the chance 
of information reaching pilots in a timely matter.  
4.3. Improving Pilot Understanding of SSA Procedures 
For the DC ADIZ, a Control Level 2 SSA, failure to understand the procedures for allowed 
penetration of the SSA is the second most common cause of violations, accounting for a 
substantial number of all SSA violations (see Table 1). Over the course of a year and half after 
the DC ADIZ was imposed, pilots continued to misunderstand these procedures, accounting for 
about 15% of all SSA violations in the entire country (Zuschlag, 2005). With time, such errors 
should diminish as the local pilots become fully educated on the ADIZ. However, Control Level 
2 SSAs of similar size as the DC ADIZ are being imposed throughout the country, usually as part 
of a presidential TFR. One can also imagine transitory or recurrent Control Level 2 SSAs being 
imposed in various places in response to changes in the terrorism threat level, as happened for 
New York City during the invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. In either case, pilots in these regions, 
often near major metropolitan areas, are unacquainted with the procedures, and, barring 
intervention, can be expected to make the same errors observed in the early months after the DC 
ADIZ was imposed. For the four weeks that the New York Control Level 2 SSA was active, the 
frequency of violations was comparable to that for the DC ADIZ during the same period (the DC 
ADIZ had been imposed a mere two months earlier), suggesting the experience of the DC ADIZ 
is typical for any new Control Level 2 SSA (Zuschlag, 2005). 
4.3.1. Standardize and Improve Descriptions of Restrictions 
Just as with the descriptions of the boundaries of SSAs, the descriptions of the entry requirements 
can also benefit from replacing the current stream of text with a standard formatting, arranging 
the information in fields, and using varying emphasis to communicate the structure of the 
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restrictions. One possible approach is shown in Figure 8. Indenting and spacing are used to 
organize information, with headings and key information in bold print to catch the eye of a 
scanning pilot. As with the table in Figure 7, cross-references are provided to a mapped depiction 
of the SSAs (see Appendix, Page 54), which may be hyperlinked (represented by underlining in 
Figure 8). 
 Restrictions 1 (see map reference Areas 2 and 3) 
Prohibited: All aircraft operations. 
Exceptions:  
Law enforcement and military aircraft directly supporting the United States Secret Service (USSS) 
and the Office of the President of the United States,  
Emergency medical flights in which the flight operations company coordinates operations in 
advance with the USSS at 850-444-5646 in order to avoid potential delays. 
Regularly scheduled commercial passenger and all-cargo carriers arriving into and/or departing 
from 14 CFR Part 139 airports and operating under any of the following:  
Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program (AOSSP),  
Domestic Security Integration Program (DSIP),  
Twelve Five Standard Security Program (TFSSP),  
All-Cargo International Security Procedure (ACISP) 
Restrictions 2 (see map reference Area 1) 
Requirements: All aircraft shall  
Be on an active IFR or VFR flight plan.  
Squawk an ATC-assigned discrete transponder code prior to departure and at all times in the TFR.  
Remain in two-way radio communications with ATC. 
Exceptions:  
Emergency medical flights in which the flight operations company coordinates operations in 
advance with the USSS at 850-444-5646 in order to avoid potential delays. 
Prohibited:  
Loitering. 
Flight training. 
Practice instrument approaches. 
Aerobatic flight. 
Glider operations. 
Parachute operations. 
Ultralight flight. 
Hang gliding. 
Ballooning. 
Agriculture/crop dusting. 
Animal population control flight operations. 
Banner towing.  
Additional Information: All USSS cleared aircraft operators based in the area should notify the USSS at 850-
444-5646 prior to their departure.  
Notes 
It is recommended that all aircraft operators check NOTAMs frequently for possible required changes to this TFR prior to 
operations within this region.  
These flight restrictions are pursuant to title 14, section 91.141, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). 
 
Figure 8. Mockup of restrictions information for 5/1953, formatted for better reference and 
readability (compare to Figure 1). 
4.3.2. Standardize and Simplify the SSA Procedures 
There are interventions that may decrease the number of violations due to not understanding SSA 
procedures, even procedures for transitory Control Level 2 SSAs. Among these is simplifying and 
standardizing the procedure for Control Level 2 penetration. Currently the procedure can vary 
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even within a single SSA. For example, the procedure for getting a transponder code and 
clearance into the DC ADIZ varies by the airport of departure (see Table 4).  
Table 4. Variations in Control Level 2 departure procedures for airports in the Washington 
DC ADIZ and FRZ (AOPA, 2004b). 
Airport 
Abbreviation 
Phone Number to 
File Flight Plan 
Contact for 
Transponder Code 
Phone Number/ 
Frequency 
Airborne 
Frequency 
00B 800-WX-BRIEF Potomac TRACON24 866-429-5882 119.7 
0V5 800-WX-BRIEF Potomac TRACON2 866-709-4993 124.65 
2W5 800-WX-BRIEF Potomac TRACON2 866-599-3874 119.85 
ANP 800-WX-BRIEF Potomac TRACON2 866-429-5882 119.7 
BWI 800-WX-BRIEF Clearance Delivery 118.05 126.753 
CGS1 866-225-7410 Potomac TRACON 866-599-3874 119.85 
FME 800-WX-BRIEF Potomac TRACON2 866-429-5882 119.7 
GAI 800-WX-BRIEF Clearance Delivery 121.60 128.7 
HEF 800-WX-BRIEF Clearance Delivery 120.20 124.65 
IAD 800-WX-BRIEF Clearance Delivery 135.70 126.65, 125.053 
JYO 800-WX-BRIEF Clearance Delivery 118.55 126.1 
VKX1 866-225-7410 Potomac TRACON 866-599-3874 125.65 
W00 800-WX-BRIEF Potomac TRACON2 866-599-3874 119.3 
W18 800-WX-BRIEF Potomac TRACON2 866-429-5882 126.75 
W321 866-225-7410 Potomac TRACON 866-599-3874 125.65 
W48 800-WX-BRIEF Potomac TRACON2 866-429-5882 119.0 
W50 800-WX-BRIEF Potomac TRACON2 866-429-5882 128.7 
1Located in the FRZ, pilots conducting flight operations must also be vetted. 
2Apparently, it is also sometimes possible to get the transponder code from 800-WX-BRIEF. 
3Or frequency assigned by clearance delivery. 
4Terminal Radar Approach Control 
Instead, there should be standard, specific, continuously available, nation-wide communication 
channels that support the entire Control Level 2 procedure: filing a flight plan, activating it, and 
receiving a transponder code and clearance. The principal is that pilots operating in or near static 
or recurrent Control Level 2 or 2a SSAs will get into the habit of using the same channel for all 
flights without concern for the airport of origin. Details specific to that airport (e.g., whether to 
follow Control Level 2 or 2a rules) can be handled in the course of the communication.  
For this to benefit transitory Control Level 2 SSAs, the access point should be a contact 
commonly used by pilots in the ordinary course of preparing for flights. One candidate is the toll-
free number for briefings by FSS controllers (currently, 1-800-WX-BRIEF). The FSS controllers 
contacted through this number, in addition to briefing the pilot (including on the existence of the 
SSA) and taking the pilot’s flight plan as normal, can connect the pilot with the appropriate ATC 
facility for the pilot to receive his or her clearance, approach control frequency, and transponder 
code. By standardizing the process for all airports and SSAs, training of FSS controllers is 
simplified and the chance of error is reduced. NOTAMs for a transitory SSA can explicitly 
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instruct pilots to call FSS before takeoff in order to comply with the Control Level 2 
requirements. Working through FSS can work for towered airports too, provided that standard 
language is used to emphasize that a clearance into a SSA does not constitute clearance to depart 
the airport or to enter other controlled airspace (e.g., Class D).  
In a more technically advanced system, the FSS controller can deliver the clearance and code 
directly to the pilot by communicating electronically with the ATC facility. Electronic flight plan 
activation with clearance delivery is discussed in greater detail in Section 5.4.3, but the capacity 
for it within the FAA and with selected other agencies opens additional candidates for single-
contact compliance with Control Level 2 requirements. The radio frequencies for FSSs can be 
used, so a single radio call from an airborne pilot approaching a SSA could yield a filed and 
activated flight plan, and the code and clearance for entry into the SSA.  
Another contact point that would benefit from electronic flight plan activation with clearance 
delivery would be electronic briefing services such as DUATS and DUAT. Having entered a 
flight plan previously or in the same session, a pilot can activate it and receive clearance and 
code. Electronic flight plan filing can already be done through DUATS and DUAT, but only for 
flights that do not enter Control Level 2 SSAs..  
Barring electronic flight plan activation, the FSS controller contacted from the air should at least 
be able to hand off the pilot to ATC for clearance and code. NOTAMs for transitory SSA should 
include the ATC frequencies that may be used. 
4.3.3. Standardize SSA Control Levels 
SSA control levels have been gravitating to the levels given in Table 2. Confusion about the 
procedures for these control levels can be reduced by formalizing, standardizing, naming, and 
documenting the control levels. To minimize the training, memory burden, and confusion, the 
number of standard control levels should be kept to a bare minimum. Four is likely to be an 
acceptable number of levels.  
Once standardized, pilots can be taught about the required procedures as part of normal flight 
training. Reference manuals such as the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) (FAA, 2004d) 
can provide details in the event the exact procedures are forgotten. When a transitory SSA is 
imposed, pilots will at most need only a quick brush up. Standardization also simplifies training 
and minimizes the chance of error for ATC and FSS personnel. 
Procedures for each control level should be sufficiently standard and clear such that if a NOTAM 
states that a “Control Level 2 TFR” has been imposed, or that a static SSA is being temporarily 
upgraded from “Control Level 3” to “Control Level 1,” pilots can know or easily find out what is 
required without further reference to the NOTAM. With such standardization, the full formatted 
description of the requirements, as shown in Figure 8, will not need to be included with every 
NOTAM, reducing the information clutter a pilot must sift through when reviewing a preflight 
briefing report. The NOTAM can be limited to just information specific to a particular SSA, such 
as its boundaries in the case of a transitory SSA. With such terminology defined, the 
Airport/Facility Directory can note the control level for each airport in a static or recurrent SSA. 
For charts and maps associated with SSAs, each standard control level should have 
distinguishable symbology so that pilots looking at the chart or map can immediately recognize 
the required procedures.  
While standardization should be maximized as much as feasible, allowance should be provided 
for additional requirements or licenses for a given transitory SSA activation for very exceptional 
circumstances in response to a specific threat or vulnerability. Such exceptions should be 
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prominently indicated in the associated NOTAMs, using formatting techniques discussed in 
Sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.4, and shown in Figure 8.  
Standardization and formalization of the control levels will be of particular benefit to Control 
Level 2 and 2a SSAs. Control Level 2 SSAs vary in their requirements, with transitory SSAs, 
such as those for presidential TFRs, tending to restrict more operations than static SSAs, such as 
the DC ADIZ (e.g., compare FAA 2003a with 2005b). The Control Level 2a SSAs within the DC 
ADIZ, meanwhile, are relatively vaguely and inconsistently defined. Sometimes both airport 
arrival and departure is allowed under standard codes, and sometimes only departure (see Table 
5). The allowed regions or paths are ill-defined for many airports, and there have been violations 
due to misunderstandings of the text descriptions provided in the NOTAMs (Zuschlag, 2005).  
As feasible for each SSA’s degree of stability, these regions should be specifically defined and 
placed on the maps provided with the associated NOTAMs, and on sectionals and other 
navigation maps, as well as in GPS displays. For static and recurrent SSAs, the standard 
transponder codes should be printed in the chart margins and be available in the AFD notes for 
the airport. 
Table 5. Variations in Control Level 2a procedures for airports within the DC ADIZ (AOPA 
2004b, 2004c). Note that only two airports allow arrivals under standard transponder codes. For 
the others, arrivals follow Control Level 2 procedures. 
Airport 
Abbreviation 
Departure 
Code 
Arrival 
Code 
Airborne Frequency1 
1W5 1205 None Potomac TRACON 128.7 
2VG2 1205 None Potomac TRACON 124.65 
3VA1 1205 None Potomac TRACON 124.65 
3W3 1233 1233 Common Traffic Advisory Frequency 122.7 
4MD9 1205 None Potomac TRACON 126.75 
7MD9 1205 None Potomac TRACON 119.7 
AVA9 1205 None Potomac TRACON 124.65 
MD48 1205 None Potomac TRACON 119.0 
MD64 1205 None Potomac TRACON 119.7 
MD90 1205 None Potomac TRACON 119.7 
MD92 1205 None Potomac TRACON 119.0 
MTN 1205 None Potomac TRACON 119.0 
VA97 1205 None Potomac TRACON 124.65 
W29 1227 1227 Common Traffic Advisory Frequency 123.0 
1Pilots are required to monitor the respective frequency, but do not have to contact with ATC. 
4.3.4. Education and Training 
Standardization of procedures and control levels will eventually reduce the frequency of SSA 
violations due to procedure misunderstanding, but until then pilots still must climb a learning 
curve regarding these new kinds of airspace. In the mean time, errors can be somewhat reduced 
by introducing new standard language for FSS and ATC controllers to emphasize the peculiar 
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aspects about SSAs. For example, FSS briefers can remind pilots to “squawk discrete code before 
takeoff,” since a common error is for pilots to attempt to get a clearance and transponder code 
immediately after takeoff into a Control Level 2 SSA, this being a common practice in other 
analogous situations (Zuschlag, 2005).  
Another common error is setting the transponder to the standard VFR code (1200) when ATC 
services, such as IFR flight, are terminated within a Control Level 2 SSA. Again, this standard 
practice for flight outside a SSA, and pilots may find themselves doing this unthinkingly once 
ATC announces its services have ended. By changing the standard language for ending services 
in a SSA (e.g., “Maintain squawk <code>. Radar services now terminated.”), ATC can cue the 
pilot to follow the proper procedure, and prevent pilots from thinking or assuming they heard 
instructions to “squawk VFR.”  
The FAA can also continue its educational outreach to pilots in the interim before training on the 
standardized control levels becomes a normal part of ground school. The widespread application 
of SSAs over the past three years represent a substantial change in the airspace and warrants an 
aggressive educational campaign, probably on a scale similar to what has been done for runway 
incursions (FAA, 2002d) or the conversion of Terminal Control Areas (TCAs) to Class B 
airspace in 1992. Such an outreach may also be necessary for any future SSA that does not follow 
“standard” levels of control (e.g., a SSA that uses the gateway airport model of control described 
in Section 2.1). Possible avenues of outreach include: 
 Safety seminars normally held by the local Flight Standards District Office. 
 Biannual recurrent VFR ground instruction. 
 Incorporation in the educational materials shipped to flight instructors. 
 The FAASafety.gov electronic newsletter. 
Perhaps an annual educational push can be conducted each February, since there is some reason 
to believe that the frequency of SSA violations is especially high in March and April, as flying 
activity increases with the coming of spring (Zuschlag, 2005). 
5. The Long Term: ISARC 
With a long-term view, new technologies can be developed to attain a more dramatic reduction in 
the frequency of accidental violations of SSAs than can be achieved by just changing the content 
and form of SSA information. Such short-term changes to content and form are expected to 
reduce violations, but the present technical system would still require pilots to search effectively 
for the information prior to flight and to accurately recall and use the information once 
approaching an SSA. This will have an inherently limited impact. In pursuing long term 
technological interventions, it becomes possible to conceive of a system that "pushes" SSA 
information to the pilot with nominal initiation on his or her part. Furthermore, this information 
can be presented to the pilot not just during flight planning, but while airborne, including shortly 
before a potential violation. With the information presented temporally proximal to the potential 
violation, recall failures and errors are minimized. The system can select when, where, and how 
to present such information based on selected contextual information (e.g., aircraft location) from 
sources that are likely to be more accurate than those provided by the pilot. Finally, the system 
can automate various processes, or at least offer recommended actions for the pilot to approve, 
reducing the probability of pilot error in manually carrying out the procedures required by an 
SSA.   
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Specifically, one can envision the future implementation of an Integrated System for Airspace 
Requirements Compliance (ISARC), a set of digital device features that supports the following 
root functions to be available to the pilot both while on the ground and while airborne: 
 Presentation of up-to-date information on any SSA of any degree of stability, including the 
display of the SSA on an electronic moving map. 
 Fully mechanized filing and activation of SSA flight plans and reception of SSA clearances 
and transponder codes. 
 Alerting of the potential for a SSA violation. 
For system to provide such functions in the air, it will almost certainly require that new devices 
be aboard aircraft. Given that an effective intervention requires that these devices be aboard the 
vast majority of all low-end general aviation aircraft (as well as other aircraft), such devices must 
be compatible with all principles given in Section 3, including low cost. For a more long term 
intervention, the need to follow these principles is likely to be even more important since future 
airspace is expected to include large numbers of light sport aircraft (AvWeb 2004; FAA, 2004g), 
pilots of which should have and use devices that include ISARC. Details for conforming to these 
principles are discussed further in Section 5.6. 
5.1. Functional Requirements 
The following sections detail the requirements for each root function of ISARC. Unless otherwise 
stated, all requirements apply both when the aircraft is airborne and when on the ground. 
5.1.1. SSA Presentation 
ISARC is capable of providing up-to-date information on any SSA. The information available to 
the pilot includes the SSA’s activation time, control level or compliance procedure, ceiling, 
special (e.g., SSA-specific) requirements, and other information relevant to complying with the 
SSA. Changes in a SSA's attributes, including its activation, are provided in real time from when 
the changes come into effect or earlier. This includes the establishment and activation of 
transitory SSAs. 
ISARC is capable of displaying the SSA information in several formats to best support the pilot's 
task of complying with the SSA. This includes a strategic map display of the SSA, showing its 
position and boundaries for a pilot-selected map view, and a tactical map display, showing the 
SSA relative to the aircraft's current position with an appropriate frequency of position updates 
(e.g., RTCA, 2003). Both map display types are capable of showing the SSA relative to other 
aeronautical objects as described in Section 4.2.2. The control level of the SSA is symbolically 
differentiated on the map displays.  
ISARC is also capable of displaying the SSA information as text, with the format and layout 
designed to maximize understandability and compliance (see Sections 4.2.4 and 4.3.1). 
5.1.2. Mechanized Filing and Activation of SSA Flight Plans  
ISARC is capable of receiving or retrieving a pilot-entered flight plan. The flight plan may be 
retrieved from a separate device or component, or a flight planning capability may incorporated 
with ISARC into a single device to allow the creating, updating, and deleting flight plans. ISARC 
is then capable of formally filing the retrieved flight plan by electronically sending it to a ground-
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based FSS or ATC authority as appropriate. ISARC is capable of both initiating and updating a 
flight plan in this manner. Included with the flight plan is the following information: 
 Flight plan type: IFR, VFR, or VFR for SSA penetration (i.e., defense-VFR). 
 Aircraft identity and description. 
 Pilot identity and contact information. 
 Aircraft capabilities, as appropriate (e.g., if aircraft is equipped with digital radio). 
 Other information necessary to file a flight plan (e.g., occupant information). 
ISARC is capable of sending a request for clearance into a SSA and receiving clearance 
authorization in return. As the aircraft approaches entry into a SSA, this request may be 
transmitted automatically, or ISARC can prompt the pilot to transmit the request. 
Having received a SSA clearance, ISARC is capable of processing the information included with 
the clearance for use by the pilot and the ISARC alerting function. This information includes the 
transponder code and the necessary communication radio frequency for SSA penetration. As a 
minimum, ISARC is capable of displaying the code and radio frequency to the pilot (e.g., as a 
notice or as an item on an electronic checklist). Optionally, ISARC interfaces with the 
transponder and/or radios, setting the transponder code automatically, and tuning the standby 
radio to the appropriate frequency. ISARC is capable of verifying that the code transmitted by the 
transponder corresponds to the code received with the clearance. 
ISARC is capable of displaying the status of the clearance for a SSA, indicating if the pilot is 
cleared to enter the SSA or not. The pilot is able to determine from the device the reason for a 
lack of clearance (e.g., no filed flight plan, no activated flight plan, or ATC-rejected flight plan). 
ISARC is also capable of indicating if the flight plan has been closed or canceled and if the 
transponder code is no longer valid or required (e.g., due to the aircraft exiting the corresponding 
SSA under VFR). 
ISARC supports the electronic closing and canceling of flight plans. The pilot is able to manually 
close and cancel a flight plan filed with ATC with real time effect. ISARC is capable of 
automatically closing a flight plan on determination that the flight has been completed (e.g., 
aircraft arrives on the ground at the destination or alternative airport as entered in the flight plan). 
ISARC does not close the flight plan if there are indications of a mishap (e.g., sharp drop in 
ground speed to zero). ISARC notifies the pilot if it does not close a flight plan for this reason. 
Optionally, ISARC can take measures to alert the authorities in the event of such a mishap. 
The ISARC capacity to process flight plans includes conveniently supporting flight plans 
involving pattern work at an airport, being able to file, activate, monitor, and possibly close such 
plans. ISARC is designed such that it is not necessary to file and activate a new flight plan with 
every takeoff when using a flight plan involving pattern work. 
5.1.3. Alerting of Potential for SSA Violation 
ISARC is capable of alerting the pilot if there are indications of the potential for a violation of a 
SSA. An ISARC alert is presented at a level of attention-getting that corresponds to the urgency 
of pilot action to avoid a violation. At the lowest level of alert, potential for violation is on the 
order of hours away. At the highest level, pilots must respond in less than a minute to avoid a 
violation. The alert level may vary from the display of a small symbol or annunciator to a 
prominent alert message and aural, possibly speech, alarm.  
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ISARC is capable of providing the appropriate level of alert for all the conditions given in Table 
6. High level alerts include an indication of the imminence of the violation and perhaps offer a 
course of action to avoid a violation (Stock, 2004). For example, as the aircraft is approaching a 
SSA, an alerting message on the display may give a countdown of tenths of nautical miles until 
anticipated penetration. If the SSA is at Control Level 2, and a valid unfiled flight plan is 
available to the device, ISARC can offer to file and activate it. If the SSA is at Control Level 1, 
ISARC may offer an alternative course that will best avoid penetration, possibly allowing for 
other considerations (e.g., terrain).  
ISARC is capable of determining if the aircraft is on the ground and not positioned for departure 
and thereby suppresses alerts. Alerts are triggered under the conditions in Table 6 on indication 
that the aircraft is preparing for takeoff at an airport in a SSA (e.g., positioned between ends of a 
runway and oriented on the runway's heading). 
Table 6. ISARC alert conditions and levels. 
Condition Alert Level 
An entered flight plan conflicts or is especially 
close to a SSA.  
Medium for Control Level 1. Low for Control 
Level 2, 2a, or 3.  
A new active SSA relevant to the flight plan or 
current general location has been imposed since 
the pilot filed the flight plan. 
Medium for Control Level 1 2, or 2a. Low for 
Control Level 3 
Current track and altitude or vertical speed will 
imminently bring the aircraft into a SSA.  
High for Control Level 1. High for 2 if no flight 
plan is activated. Low for Control Level 3. 
Current speed, flight plan and/or track will cause 
the aircraft to become trapped in a SSA that is 
about to activate. 
High for Control Level 1. High for 2 if no flight 
plan is activated. Low for Control Level 3. 
Transponder is not squawking the appropriate 
code while approaching a Control Level 2 or 2a 
SSA.  
High 
Pilot attempts to change the transponder from 
the appropriate code while in a Control Level 2 or 
2a SSA. 
High. If ISARC can control the transponder, it 
requests pilot confirmation before the 
transponder code is actually changed. 
Pilot attempts to cancel the flight plan while in a 
Control Level 2 SSA.7 
High. ISARC requests pilot confirmation 
before actually canceling the flight plan. 
The aircraft is deviating from an activated flight 
plan. 
High when in a Control Level 2 SSA. Medium 
otherwise. 
The aircraft is deviating from an acceptable path 
while in a Control Level 2a SSA. 
High 
5.1.4. Additional Functions 
The following functions are not related to ISARC's three root functions, nor are they intended to 
reduce the frequency of violations of SSAs. They are additional optional features whose value is 
to mitigate the possible repercussions of a violation. Depending on the implementation of the on-
board device that incorporates ISARC and its relation to other devices, such functions can be 
supported by leveraging the ISARC components necessary for the root functions. 
                                                          
7 There is no alert if the pilot attempts to amend the flight plan. 
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Among these additional functions is an ability for an authorized air traffic controller, law 
enforcement officer, or interceptor pilot to unilaterally extract flight plan information from the 
device incorporating ISARC (whether filed and activated or not), along with the aircraft identity 
and type. Another is a dedicated radio emergency communication channel that allows authorized 
personnel to contact the pilot irrespective of what the aircraft's communications radio is tuned to 
or even if the radio is on. ATC or interceptors may use this channel to contact a pilot who is 
violating a SSA when all normal channels fail. With the ability to extract information and 
establish communication with a violating aircraft, authorities can make a more accurate 
assessment of the risk presented by the aircraft, minimizing the chance of a misunderstanding 
resulting in targeting the aircraft as a high-level threat. 
5.2. Infrastructure Requirements 
ISARC will rely on various routine processes to exchange information between the on board 
device and ground agencies. Ground-to-ground versions of many of these processes already exist, 
but need to be revised to best suit ISARC. Chief among these is a means to transfer the latest SSA 
information to each instance of ISARC. This may involve various organizations in the FAA 
coordinating to distribute the information to the device's vendor for subsequent reformatting and 
distribution to the pilot (much as is now done for the databases for GPS moving map devices). 
Alternatively, the FAA can make the information directly available to the pilot for downloading 
into the device incorporating ISARC. In order to include information on transitory SSAs and 
recurrent SSA activation, this distribution will need to include information that is usually covered 
by NOTAMs. In order to meet the requirement for up-to-date information, the capability must 
exist to transmit such information to a moving aircraft.  
To be maximally effective at meeting its functional requirements and thereby reducing violations 
of SSAs, ISARC (as proposed) depends on an infrastructure that includes the implementation of 
many of the short-term interventions discussed in Section 4. ISARC, in this way, builds on more 
immediate interventions, and such short term intervention retain their value after ISARC has 
reached widespread deployment. Among the key short-term interventions that ISARC needs is 
the replacement of blanket NOTAMs with individual SSAs (Section 4.1.6). ISARC can no better 
than a pilot reliably keep track of all locations and events that may qualify under these NOTAMs. 
Instead, ISARC needs information on specific locations with specific boundaries and time for 
displaying them and alerting the pilot. 
Improving and standardizing the format and language of NOTAMs is equally important for 
deploying ISARC as it is for achieving short term impacts (Sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.4). A pilot 
using ISARC to display information about a SSA would benefit as much from better formatting 
as a pilot retrieving such information from the web. For ISARC, it is especially important for the 
FAA to offer a standardized machine-readable format for SSA information (Section 4.2.5), so that 
ISARC can correctly interpret the requirements of a SSA and alert the pilot accordingly. If 
ISARC has to extract requirements from free-form text NOTAMs, it may make errors in 
determining the requirements, and such errors will lead to pilots distrusting and ultimately not 
using ISARC. In line with this intervention is the standardization of SSAs into a few levels of 
control, each with standard names and symbology (Section 4.3.3). This will allow ISARC to 
present precise and accurate representations of the SSAs, using symbols consistent with paper 
charts. With standardized control levels, ISARC can minimize the number of alert false alarms. 
Electronic flight plan activation with clearance delivery requires a new capability on the ground 
to accept such electronic flight plans, pass them to appropriate personnel in the FAA, and 
transmit back a clearance and transponder code. This represents the most significant new 
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infrastructure change needed for ISARC to realize its full potential, especially for minimizing 
violations of Control Level 2 SSAs. Electronic flight plan activation is defined as a fully 
automated process for filing and activating a flight plan via electronic links to an FSS/ATC 
system. For flights into a Control Level 2 SSA, the FSS/ATC system automatically reviews it, 
and, on approval, passes the information to the appropriate controller. The system then sends 
back to the pilot an approved clearance, transponder code, and radio frequency to contact ATC 
for when the aircraft enters the SSA. Approval of the flight plan would be based on an 
algorithmic review of the flight plan against any special security requirements of the SSA. In 
general, any reasonable flight plan would be routinely approved. 
Because the air traffic controller is not responsible for ensuring separation for an aircraft 
operating under VFR, such a clearance can be automated because the controller does not have to 
coordinate the aircraft’s entry into the airspace with other traffic. As such, this form of automated 
clearance delivery is limited to flights into SSAs. If the pilot intends to fly IFR or enter Class B 
(major terminal) airspace, an air traffic controller may likely have to become involved, although 
in the future the controller may deliver the clearance through the same electronic channel (Morse, 
2004). This is similar to the current process where clearance into a SSA does not necessarily 
constitute clearance into other airspace imbedded within. 
While electronic flight plan activation and clearance delivery represents a new capability, as 
discussed in Section 4.3.1, it may be valuable for reducing SSA violations even before ISARC is 
deployed. Once electronic flight plan activation is implemented for ground-based electronic 
briefing services, extending it to ISARC becomes a relatively small extension. 
5.3. Performance Requirements  
The requirements for ISARC regarding accuracy, reliability, and integrity are much the same as 
for any avionics (e.g., RTCA, 2003). In particular, it is necessary for ISARC to be sufficiently 
accurate and reliable to meet the FAA's criteria for a sole source of SSA information. In addition, 
like any avionics, a detectable failure of ISARC must not endanger the aircraft before the pilot 
can respond and an undetectable failure of ISARC must not endanger the aircraft in any case. For 
example, an implementation of ISARC must not fail in a manner that it displays hazardously 
misleading information. Furthermore, the operation of ISARC must not compromise the safe 
operation of the aircraft as a whole. For example, an ISARC-generated alert must not be so 
intense that it distracts pilots from more important information in the cockpit. Likewise, the 
workload associated with the correct use of ISARC must not interfere with safety-critical tasks of 
flight. Beyond these requirements, a certain level reliability, accuracy, effectiveness, and ease of 
use are necessary to maximize the probability of pilot acquisition and use of ISARC (see Section 
3). 
5.4. Technological Elements and Development Needs 
There are numerous ways to implement ISARC as defined above. However, a fast and affordable 
implementation can be expected to capitalize on existing and emerging technological elements. 
The fewer elements that need to be developed from scratch, the more rapidly ISARC can become 
available to a large proportion of pilots, and the larger impact it will have on reducing violations 
of SSAs. The elements, their relation to ISARC, and their current development status are 
summarized in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Existing and new technological elements that may be used to implement ISARC’s 
functional requirements. 
Element Related Features Related Requirements  Status 
GPS Moving Map 
Devices 
Platform for ISARC.  See Table 8. Deployed 
Electronic Flight 
Bags (EFBs) 
Additional platform 
for ISARC. 
Same as GPS moving map 
devices. 
Prototyped 
Universal Access 
Transceiver (UAT) 
Aircraft-ground 
datalink protocol 
developed for 
general aviation. 
En route updating of SSA 
information. 
Electronic flight plan activation and 
automated reception of SSA 
clearances. 
Field testing 
Flight Information 
Service – Broadcast 
(FIS-B) 
General information 
service for datalink. 
En route updating of SSA 
information. 
Field testing 
Digital Radio Always-available 
emergency 
channels. 
Communication with violating 
aircraft. 
Under 
development
Wide Area 
Augmentation 
System (WAAS) 
Aircraft altitude and 
precise position. 
Suppression of false alerts when 
taxiing. 
Currently 
being 
deployed 
System Wide 
Information 
Management 
(SWIM) 
Infrastructure for 
inter-agency 
information transfer. 
SSA information transmission. 
Electronic flight plan activation and 
automated clearance delivery. 
Under 
development
FAA 
Telecommunications 
Infrastructure (FTI) 
Infrastructure for 
information transfer 
within the FAA. 
SSA information transmission. 
Electronic flight plan activation and 
automated clearance delivery. 
Under 
development
Electronic flight plan 
activation and SSA 
clearance. 
Infrastructure for 
automated flight 
plan processing. 
Electronic flight plan activation and 
automated clearance delivery. 
To be 
proposed 
5.4.1. Current Technologies 
A root requirement of ISARC is the on-board map display if SSAs relative to the aircraft. As 
such, it is functionally closest to existing cockpit GPS navigation and situation awareness moving 
map devices. Marketed at general aviation pilots, these moving map devices generally feature a 
GPS receiver, a database of aeronautical objects, a map generator to create an image of these 
objects in relation to the current position of the aircraft, and a graphic display to show the image. 
Typically, the vendor provides periodic updates for the database that the pilot manually uploads 
through a physical port or data storage device reader. 
Moving map devices provide basic functions related to ISARC. Many of these devices will show 
airspace (e.g., Class B, C, D, etc.) on their moving map displays (Aircraft Electronics Association 
(AEA), 2004). Other products, such as those provided by Weather Services International, already 
provide graphic depiction of TFRs on cockpit displays (AEA, 2004; see also Higdon, 2002). 
Built-in databases of moving map devices allow the pilot to access text information about various 
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aeronautical objects and procedures. Today’s GPS moving map devices also provide functionality 
closely related to the requirement to support filing and activating of SSA flight plans. Even the 
cheaper versions of these devices allow pilots to create and edit complete flight plans, which may 
be saved and retrieved for later flights. The pilot can not file the flight plan from these devices, 
but electronic filing of flight plans is a feature of the ground-based DUATS and DUAT systems, 
so there is precedence for this capability. As for the requirement to alert of potential SSA 
violations, some cockpit GPS devices will alert the pilot if she or he approaches certain airspace 
(e.g., Class B). Finally, the more sophisticated devices include built-in navigation and 
communication radios, electronic checklists, and control of the transponder (AEA, 2004; Garmin, 
2004).  
ISARC is thus an extension of current GPS moving map devices to the new domain of SSAs. 
Table 8 summarizes these extensions. It can be assumed that a device incorporating ISARC will 
include all the more general functions in the "Current GPS Moving Map Device Capability" 
column of Table 8. As such, ISARC is not expected to be implemented as a separate SSA-specific 
device, but rather a set of features to be found in future GPS moving map devices designed to 
assist the pilot in avoiding violations of SSAs among other functions. With ISARC as an integral 
part of such a general-purpose product, pilots are more likely to include the device in all planning 
and flying, and thus ISARC will be available regardless of if the pilot is anticipating a SSA or 
not. SSA compliance will not be a separate task in future flight, but an integral element of flight 
planning, navigating, and communicating.  
Table 8. Extension of current GPS devices to ISARC functions. 
Current GPS Moving Map Device Capability Extension for ISARC’s Requirements 
Moving map display of airspace Moving map display of SSAs. 
Information on aeronautical objects and 
procedures 
Information on SSA attributes and required 
procedures 
Flight plan creation, editing, storage, and 
retrieval 
Flight plan filing, activation, updating, and 
closing 
Alerting of conflicts with airspace Alerting of conflicts with SSAs 
5.4.2. Developing Technologies 
For ISARC to be fully functional, some new technology will have to be available. Fortunately 
much of this technology is currently being developed and deployed for reasons other than 
security.   
While ISARC can obtain much of the information it displays by the conventional methods used 
by present day moving map devices, the ISARC requirements for up-to-date SSA information and 
electronic flight plan activation imply electronic communication between the ground 
infrastructure and the moving aircraft. Current work to develop datalink, including protocols such 
as Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) and services such as Flight Information Service - 
Broadcast (FIS-B), will make it possible for the latest information to be automatically transferred 
to and from ISARC, including information that today is only available through NOTAMs (Strain, 
2004). Flight plan activation requests and subsequent SSA clearances can also be transferred over 
such protocols. While still in the testing phase of development, UAT with FIS-B is undergoing 
rapid expansion and is currently available throughout the eastern US seaboard (FAA, 2005f; 
Strain, 2004). 
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Digital radio will also offer new options for communication between the aircraft and the ground, 
including the possibility of an always-on emergency voice communication channel. The channel 
can even be design to be heard by the pilot even if the radio's microphone key is stuck (Morse, 
2004). While currently available GPS moving map devices is perhaps the most logical product to 
include ISARC, the new and more general purpose electronic flight bags (EFBs), with their own 
GPS modules and databases, is an additional possibility (Chandra, et, al., 2003) that may make 
ISARC available to an even wider range of pilots. 
Meanwhile, on the ground, deployment of the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) is 
proceeding, which, in addition to allowing navigation with greater precision and integrity, can 
also be used to determine altitude in lieu of the traditional barometric altimeter. This will allow a 
self-contained device to determine if an aircraft is flying over an airport or merely taxiing on its 
surface, thus making it possible for ISARC to suppress false alerts of SSA penetration. National 
network interconnection initiatives, such as System Wide Information Management and the FAA 
Telecommunications Infrastructure wide-area network, will provide the infrastructure for faster, 
more widespread, and more automatic transfer of digital information among government 
agencies, including SSA declarations and activations.  
5.4.3. Future Developments 
The most significant all-new development needed to fulfill ISARC’s requirements is the 
infrastructure to support electronic flight plan activation and automated clearance delivery. While 
this may leverage the new FAA information infrastructure current under development (see 5.4.2 
above), certain dedicated automated processes will have to be implemented in order to actually 
receive an electronic flight plan (perhaps via datalink), review it for security requirements, route 
it to the appropriate ATC personnel, and select the proper transponder code and radio frequency 
to transmit back to the pilot. As a significant new process, electronic flight plan activation 
requires research and development largely by the government. Likely, a functioning proof-of-
concept demonstration may be the necessary first step in order to establish the feasibility to the 
FAA and to the aviation community. 
5.5. Notional System 
5.5.1. Components and Interfaces 
Figure 9 presents an example implementation of ISARC using the technological elements 
reviewed above in 5.4. Actual implementation may differ from this depending on research 
findings, the capabilities of future technology, and the details of the targeted operational 
environment and market. The notional device shown here integrates ISARC with many of the 
components found in current GPS moving map devices (shown black outline in Figure 9). Any of 
these components may be implemented as an integrated hardware, software, and network 
architecture. A database component includes flight plans that were entered through the user 
interface or uploaded through a port (if the flight plan was prepared on another device such as a 
personal computer). The database also includes all aeronautical information including 
information on all SSAs of all degrees of stability. Much of this information, including 
information on static and recurrent SSAs, may be updated through a port (e.g., from a storage unit 
shipped by the vendor). Pilots also have limited ability to create and edit information (e.g., pilot-
defined waypoints). Clearance records are kept indicating if each entry into a SSA in the flight 
plan is approved. Aircraft and pilot identity and characteristics are entered by the pilot when the 
device was acquired. A WAAS-capable GPS receiver component determines the aircraft position 
and altitude. A moving map generation component takes all this information to create a map 
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image. The user interface component includes a graphical display capable of presenting maps and 
text. SSA information, clearance statuses, and alerts may be represented as text or graphically by 
symbolic coding on the map. An aural display, possibly with synthesized voice, is used only for 
high level alerts. 
 
Figure 9. Components and flows for GPS moving map device with ISARC. All components 
shown are within an on-board airborne device. 
As a future GPS moving map device, the device also features a datalink component, allowing up-
to-the-minute information to be sent to and from the device, including SSA activation 
information, but also weather and other information that is distributed today by NOTAMs. 
Datalink is also used by the electronic flight plan activation component, which, on command 
from the pilot to activate the flight plan, sends the flight plan and aircraft identity information to 
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ATC, receiving in return clearance approval and transponder codes, the latter which may be sent 
to the transponder. The SSA compliance monitor, part of a more general monitoring and alerting 
component, takes the aircraft and SSA positions, the clearance records, and other information and 
compares these to requirements for the SSAs as stored in the database. 
The device may interface with the transponder, as shown in Figure 9, to allow ISARC to 
automatically set the transponder to the code necessary for SSA penetration once clearance is 
received. Alternatively, perhaps to avoid the additional certification issues associated with 
interfacing with panel electronics, the device may instead include a 1190 MHz transponder 
receiver so that it can detect the aircraft's current transponder setting and provide alerts if the 
transponder code does not match the code received with the clearance. Ideally, such an 
implementation of ISARC would include a 1030 MHz receiver and low-powered transmitter so 
that if no ATC interrogations are detected, ISARC can interrogate the aircraft's transponder. This 
will provide an alerting functionality even when the aircraft is not in range of ATC radar (e.g., 
when on the ground at certain airports). 
In another variation, a totally self-contained handheld unit may be implemented with an 
integrated the transponder that encodes the WAAS altitude with its response signal. The use of 
WAAS altitude rather than barometric altitude for this purpose would need to be approved by the 
FAA, but it would make it allowable for aircraft without an electrical system to fly through 
Control Level 2 and 2a SSAs. If WAAS altitude is to be used for high altitude flight (above Flight 
Level 180), surface pressure readings would have to be datalinked to the device so it can correct 
the altitude to simulate the standard barometric altimeter setting of 29.92 inches.  
Not shown in Figure 9, but also possibly included are incorporated or interfaced communication 
radios (possibly with the future digital channels) and perhaps even navigation radios.  
5.5.2. Function Implementation 
To display information about SSAs to the pilot, SSA information is stored in the database with 
other geographic and aeronautical information. Information on the boundaries of static and 
recurrent SSAs is loaded into the database through routine updates. Information on recurrent SSA 
activations and transitory SSAs is loaded automatically by datalink when the device is on and 
new information is available. The SSAs are shown graphically on the map display, along with 
other geographic information, both when the pilot is graphically editing and reviewing a flight 
plan and when the pilot has selected the moving map display. Different symbology, consistent 
with that found on official paper charts, distinguishes different levels of control. The pilot can 
also call up as text additional information from the database on any SSA, just as she or he can for 
weather, hazards, and other information useful in flight planning.  
Using the datalink, the pilot can choose to electronically file a created or amended flight plan 
with the FAA, including for flight through a Control Level 2 SSA. An annunciation on the 
display acknowledges acceptance of the plan. For a simple VFR flight, this may mean little more 
than entering the identifier of the destination airport and selecting “Send Plan.” The current 
airport, as determined from the GPS position, is the default starting point, and a single course 
path is assumed and likely flight time is calculated; pilot and aircraft information are pulled from 
the database.  
The datalink is also used to activate the flight plan for VFR flight, which includes clearance 
delivery to the cockpit for entry into Control Level 2 SSAs. Ideally, a single pilot action activates 
(or amends) the flight plan with ATC and FSS or possibly, activation is automatically triggered 
by the aircraft arriving at the start point of the flight plan (e.g., the GPS receiver indicates that the 
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aircraft is moving onto a runaway of an airport identified as the flight plan's origin). If this 
involves Control Level 2 SSA, the clearance and appropriate transponder code is received in real 
time. A status annunciator on the ISARC display informs the pilot if she or he is cleared or not, 
and the received transponder code and radio frequency is set or displayed to the pilot. The flight 
plan is automatically closed via the datalink when the aircraft arrives at its destination as 
indicated by the GPS receiver. The status annunciator also indicates if the aircraft has departed 
the SSA, although the transponder code may best be left unchanged (e.g., in case the aircraft is 
flying under IFR).  
The implementation supports ISARC’s SSA alerting functionality by continuously monitoring 
transponder setting or transmissions, along with aircraft altitude, position, and trend as 
determined from the GPS receiver, and combining this with information stored in the database on 
the SSA boundaries, aircraft flight plan, and clearances and codes in order to determine if an alert 
is warranted. For example, in general no alert is given if the WAAS altitude, current position, and 
ground speed indicate the aircraft is on the ground at an airport (where airport altitude is stored in 
the database). However if the aircraft moves towards the ends of any runway at the airport or 
otherwise enters a runway and aligns itself on the runway’s heading (where runaway end 
positions are also stored in the database), then a synthesized voice warns the pilot if a Control 
Level 1 SSA is in effect over the airport. 
In the event of certain alerts, the device displays recommended courses of action based on 
information in the database and capabilities provided by other components. For example, in 
recommending an alternative course to avoid a Control Level 1 SSA, The device may consider 
the current WAAS altitude and terrain information, the latter which may be stored in the 
database. If the incorporating GPS navigation device is currently coupled to the autopilot, the 
pilot may simply approve the course recommendation, and the device will execute it. 
5.6. Analysis 
5.6.1. Effectiveness and Timeliness 
Over eighty-five percent of violations of SSAs are due a pilot’s lack of correct knowledge or 
understanding of a SSA, specifically, the presence of the SSA, the boundaries of the SSA, and the 
procedures necessary for SSA penetration. By providing SSA presence, boundary, and procedure 
information in a most compelling representation (e.g., on a moving map), it is very improbable 
that a pilot who uses ISARC would violate a SSA due to lack of knowledge. For those that do, the 
alerting feature offers a backup to make violations even more remote. The main limit on the 
effectiveness of ISARC is the proportion of pilots that are equipped with ISARC. If nearly all 
pilots operating around static and recurrent SSAs were equipped with ISARC (these being the 
pilots most motivated to acquire ISARC), and ISARC were nearly 100% effective at preventing 
violations due lack of knowledge and understanding, then, given 75% of all violations occur in 
static and recurrent SSAs, the frequency of SSA violation can be expected to drop by 64%. If, in 
addition, half of all remaining pilots acquire ISARC (these being less motivated pilots), the 
frequency of SSA violation can be expected to drop by 75%. Given that ISARC is an integrated 
set of features of a GPS moving map device, many pilots will acquire ISARC not because they 
specifically sought it, but because it was part of a generally useful device. Indeed, in the future, as 
advanced digital electronics increase their penetration the general aviation cockpit, perhaps nearly 
all pilots will have a GPS moving map device, all which may include ISARC. In such a future, 
violations may be reduced by 85% or more. If this is achieved, the frequency of SSA violations 
will be returned to the same order of magnitude as observed before 9/11/2001. 
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By building on technology that currently exists or is already under development, the development 
time for ISARC is probably on the order of 10 years. The primary limit on faster development is 
not the incorporating device itself. GPS moving map devices already exist, and moving map 
displays using datalink have already been demonstrated. Rather, the primary limit is the time 
necessary to implement the ground infrastructure. This includes providing nation-wide datalink 
coverage, improving information transmission within federal agencies, and developing and 
supporting electronic flight plan activation. While ISARC may be about 10 years away, it is 
likely the problem it addresses will still remain. The future of the current sources of terrorism is 
unpredictable, but, while it is conceivable that it will be greatly attenuated within the next 10 
years, it seems more likely that it will remain for a number of decades (United States, 2004). 
Even if the current source is attenuated, one can anticipate new organizations with new political 
agendas attempting to emulate the same tactics as seen on 9/11/2001. In other words, SSAs may 
remain part of the aviation landscape for many years come. There is a definite need for a long-
term intervention to reduce accidental violations of SSAs. 
5.6.2. Compliance and Security Impacts 
ISARC is primarily intended to reduce accidental violations of SSAs. Given that its purpose is to 
increase compliance with flight regulations, one should consider the possibility that it could also 
unintentionally decrease compliance with regulations. With regard to automated clearance 
delivery via electronic flight plan activation, the possibility exists for pilots to confuse a SSA 
clearance for other traditional clearances (e.g., for takeoff or entry into Class B). Mitigating this 
issue is that non-SSA clearances will continue to be given through two-way radio communication 
for the near future, just as pilots are used to today. Only SSA clearances, that is, only the new 
airspace types will support automated clearance delivery. This is an improvement over the current 
system where clearance to nearly all airspace, including SSAs, is done by radio. The potential for 
a pilot to confuse clearance into a SSA to also include clearance into overlapping airspace of 
another type is higher now than it would be with ISARC, yet this does not appear to be a serious 
problem (Zuschlag, 2005). Pilots have long been acquainted with handling overlapping layers of 
airspace (e.g., Class D under Class B, or a restricted SUA in Class B). 
ISARC is not specifically designed to address a security threat, at least not directly. One may ask 
if, in seeking to reduce accidental SSA violations, ISARC will compromise security. Specifically, 
cannot a terrorist take an ISARC equipped aircraft and use the electronic flight plan activation 
component to gain access to a Control Level 2 SSA? The answer is yes, this will be possible, but 
it represents nothing different than what may be done today. There is nothing stopping a terrorist 
from using a phone or radio to file and activate a legitimate flight plan into a Control Level 2 
SSA. ISARC may offer a slightly greater security by its feature to automatically send pilot and 
aircraft identification information with the flight plan. For example, if the plane has been reported 
as stolen, the terrorist has declared its location by filing and activating a flight plan (although a 
savvy terrorist may have the knowledge and time to re-write the identifying information in the 
incorporating device’s database). It should also be remembered that reducing violations itself 
improves security by making more resources available for handling each violation. Adding 
improved communication as part of ISARC also allows any remaining accidental violations to be 
handled quickly and safely so that attention can be refocused on any other potential threats.  
5.6.3. Safety Impacts 
ISARC is also not specifically designed to directly improve safety, at least outside of minimizing 
accidents associated with interception. However, as when anything is introduced into the cockpit, 
the impact on safety must be considered for both normal and failure modes. Because ISARC is 
  
 
 42
primarily an information presentation system and because the information is not safety related, 
the impact of an ISARC failure is minimal. That is, there is simply no information about a SSA 
that ISARC could incorrectly display that would be hazardously misleading. If ISARC displays 
the wrong information about a SSA, the likely impact is either (a) the pilot avoiding airspace 
when it is not necessary, or (b) the pilot violating a SSA. The former may cost the pilot time and 
money (e.g., additional fuel) and the latter results in an enforcement action against the pilot, but 
neither are themselves safety concerns. A failure to correctly depict a SSA or alert the pilot of a 
SSA is very unlikely to result in catastrophic consequences (e.g., aircraft destruction), at least not 
without other improbable errors also occurring (e.g., by an interceptor). Providing features to 
mitigate the impact of violations, such as including an always-available emergency radio channel, 
reduces the chance of catastrophe even further. In general, a sufficient level of reliability, 
integrity, and accuracy of the SSA depictions are primarily an issue for certification (Section 
5.6.4) and pilot acceptance (Section 5.6.5), not safety. 
Regarding normal functioning, concern may also be raised that ISARC represents greater 
workload and distraction for the pilot as discussed in Section 5.3 (e.g., from alerts and display of 
SSAs, which may mask more pressing information the pilot needs). GPS moving map devices, 
for example, are already complex, offering a myriad of features and information layers. 
Accessing these features with limited controls and viewing this information on a small screen is 
already pushing the limits of acceptability in some cases. Adding ISARC increases the demands 
of the user interface. It is necessary that ISARC not interfere with other features, especially those 
related to safety of flight. The more ISARC can be integrated as part of the user interface of a 
multi-function on-board device (e.g., a general-purpose moving map display), the less impact it 
will have. On the other hand, the more ISARC is implemented as a separate device or a poorly 
integrated set of features within a multi-function device, the more workload it will likely 
represent.   
The incorporation of ISARC in large-screen state-of-the-art glass cockpits for general aviation 
aircraft is almost certainly feasible. It is believed to be also possible for a handheld unit to meet 
these requirements. For example, a decluttering feature to remove the display of SSAs from the 
moving map is likely to be a common characteristic of such devices, possibly integrated with a 
general “airspace” display mode. Only by evaluating actual implementations can it be 
demonstrated that a small device provides ISARC at acceptable levels of ease of use. Not all 
possible implementations are likely to be successful. With adequate research and attention to this 
issue, impacts can be minimized. Overall, ISARC should reduce pilot workload. Displaying the 
SSA on a moving map allows the pilot to monitor the SSA's relative position better than requiring 
the pilot to cross-reference a paper chart. Electronic flight plan activation with clearance delivery 
reduces the attention and actions necessary to obtain clearance into a Control Level 2 SSA, 
freeing pilot resources for safety concerns. 
There is also a safety issue related to displaying recommended pilot actions in the event of an 
alert of an approaching SSA. Research is need to study the possibility of the pilot blindly 
following a recommendation and possibly compromising safety for the sake of avoiding a 
violation (e.g., turning away from a SSA and into terrain or traffic). To some degree, this is 
mitigated by ISARC’s capacity to graphically display SSAs well before an alert condition is 
triggered (indeed, before the flight even begins). Thus, alerts prompting an immediate response 
by the pilot should be relatively rare. Nonetheless, the manufacturer needs to address in the 
design of this feature such a possibility. At a minimum, it needs to be made clear to the pilot what 
conditions are considered in providing the recommended action. Otherwise, this may be a feature 
that is best left out. 
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A moving map device that incorporates ISARC may also have more direct safety benefits. With 
the capacity for convenient electronic flight plan filing and activation, VFR pilots may be more 
likely fly under flight plans even when no SSA is nearby. With more pilots flying with filed flight 
plans, search and rescue can respond more quickly to an overdue aircraft. One may also ask if 
more filed flight plan means more false alarms for search and rescue due to failure to close a 
flight plan or notify FSS of a change in plans. However, the former is minimized by ISARC 
automatically closing the flight plan on arrival. The latter is minimized by ISARC alerting the 
pilot of flight plan deviations (to which the pilot may respond by amending the flight plan, or, if 
outside a SSA, easily canceling the plan). It seems more likely that if electronic flight plan 
activation and closing is widely used in lieu of manual activation and closing, the frequency of 
such false alarms would decrease. 
Finally, it should be noted that the presence of ISARC in a GPS moving map device may 
encourage pilots (e.g., those flying around static SSAs) to use such a device when otherwise they 
would not. While their main reason for using the device may be to avoid SSA violations, the 
other features will likely provide them with greater overall situation awareness, increasing overall 
safety. 
5.6.4. Certification 
To be effective, an ISARC implementation must meet the FAA's criteria for a sole source of SSA 
information. Furthermore, being on board the aircraft and possibly interfacing with panel-
mounted avionics, it may also have to be certified as a cockpit device. Certification can add 
considerably to the development time and costs of such a system. However, given that ISARC 
does not provide information related to safety of flight (see Section 5.6.3), such implementations 
may be certified at a relatively low level, comparable to devices intended for situation awareness. 
At the lowest level, ISARC may be incorporated into a handheld moving map device with no 
other connection to the aircraft other than possibly a power supply and cradle. In such an 
implementation, no interface is provided to the transponder or communication radios, although 
ISARC should be able to monitor the aircraft's transponder signal for alerting purposes. This does 
not rule out a manufacturer from choosing a higher level of certification, consistent with the 
intended market and selling price (Chandra, Yeh, Riley, and Mangold, 2003), in which the 
incorporating device is panel mounted with interfaces with cockpit systems such as the altimeter, 
radios, transponder, and autopilot. This range of potential implementation is desirable because it 
makes ISARC more widely available for more pilots and more aircraft, allowing it to have a 
larger impact on reducing violations. 
Thus, the impact of certification is that the time and cost to develop and a device with ISARC is 
comparable to the time and costs of a general-purpose GPS moving map device. ISARC does not 
add much additional certification burden. Manufacturers intending to implement ISARC can 
reduce the cost and development time by organizing with the FAA to write minimum operational 
performance standards for ISARC, which the FAA can cite in a technical standard order (TSO). 
5.6.5. Cost and Acceptance 
Cost is another consideration when evaluating the viability of ISARC. By leveraging 
infrastructure technology that will be deployed anyway, additional costs to federal agencies is 
minimized. The electronic flight plan activation component, specifically automated clearance 
delivery capability is the only element that is specific to reducing SSA violations. While 
electronic flight plan activation with clearance delivery is key for the most effective 
implementation of ISARC and important for reducing SSA violations even in the absence of 
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ISARC, it has other benefits as well. As discussed in Section 5.6.3, by making filing and 
activating a flight plan more convenient, pilots flying VFR are more likely to file flight plans in 
order to capitalize on the safety of having search and rescue promptly initiated in the event of a 
failure to complete the flight plan. While the automated clearance delivery feature is only initially 
suitable for SSAs, it may have a more general application in the future national airspace that 
implements the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS) (Joint Planning and 
Development Office, 2004). In such an environment where the responsibility for traffic separation 
is shared between aircraft and ground, automated clearance delivery may have application for 
access to dense traffic areas. The application of automated clearance delivery to SSAs may thus 
serve as test bed for such concepts. The FAA may be motivated to pursue its implementation for 
these reasons of safety improvement and future airspace development, in addition to the reducing 
SSA violations.  
Pilots are expected to bear some of the cost by purchasing and maintaining the GPS moving map 
devices that incorporated ISARC. Many if not most pilots that habitually operate near static or 
recurrent SSAs (e.g., the Washington D.C. area) are likely to accept the cost of a moving map 
device with ISARC given the penalties for violating an SSA, commonly being a two month 
suspension of one's pilot's license (Zuschlag, 2005). However, for ISARC to reduce SSA 
violations by an order of magnitude, the majority of pilots throughout much of the US should be 
equipped with such devices. With a range of moving map products marketed, from situation 
awareness devices to those certified for navigation, nearly every pilot should be able to find a unit 
that is within budget. Furthermore, with ISARC being a set of features within a more general 
product, some of the cost may be absorbed into the larger system, providing the pilot with more 
value than would be achieved with a separate dedicated device. Pilots may purchase the 
incorporating device primary for its other features, believing ISARC itself will not be necessary. 
Nonetheless, ISARC will be available for them when it is needed. 
After purchase of a device with ISARC for whatever reason, the subsequent use of ISARC is a 
voluntary action for pilots. Success of ISARC thus depends on the wide acceptance and use of 
ISARC in the pilot community. Acceptance and use probably depends mostly on the degree 
ISARC provides tangible benefit with minimal additional effort. Thus, as discussed previously, a 
certain level of accuracy and reliability, along with ease of use of the user interface is key to the 
acceptance of an ISARC implementation. With the proper infrastructure in place (e.g., the FAA 
providing machine-readable SSA information available to aircraft by datalink to compare to the 
WAAS-determined aircraft position), accuracy and reliability should be very high. A certain level 
of integrity monitoring can also be built into the system in that it flags the pilot if, for example, a 
SSA declaration is received that for some reason ISARC cannot interpret. An easy-to-use user 
interface represents a greater challenge that warrants further research. If the device is difficult to 
use, pilots may respond by not using the device during periods of high workload, which is 
typically when operating at low altitude such as on approach, precisely where a SSA violation is 
most likely.  
Currently, pilots are deeply concerned about SSA violations and appear willing to take some 
responsibility to reduce the chances of a violation on their own (Charles, 2002, 2004), and thus 
ISARC is likely to be accepted, and even welcomed. Furthermore, ISARC represents few 
inconveniences for the pilot, integrating well with normal tasks. Indeed, electronic flight plan 
activation is likely to be seen as a significant benefit: a flight need only be entered once, not twice 
as is necessary for today (once for ATC or FSS, and once for the GPS map device). Pilots may 
recognize the safety benefits of this feature even when no known SSA is present. Finally, when 
ISARC is not needed, it remains unobtrusive. Assuming the user interface requirements are met, 
  
 
 45
using a device with ISARC when no SSAs are present entails no more work than using a device 
that lacks ISARC. 
5.6.6. Alternatives 
ISARC nonetheless presents a nontrivial investment, and it is worth comparing its value to 
alternatives to reducing SSA violations. It may be argued that the short-term interventions listed 
in this paper are sufficient. However, the short-term interventions as a group have one major 
limitation that ISARC addresses: only ISARC helps the pilot avoid a SSA violation when it is 
about to occur. The short-term interventions provide help primarily during preflight. Violations 
do not occur until after the pilot is airborne, allowing time for the pilot to forget SSA information 
or become distracted while attempting to deal with SSAs. Furthermore, only ISARC addresses 
the scenario of a pilot who is simply lost (Zuschlag, 2005). Avoiding a SSA requires that pilots 
know the SSA boundaries relative to the aircraft. If the pilot is lost, knowing the absolute location 
of the boundaries by referring to a chart will not help. ISARC will display and alert the pilot to an 
approaching SSA even if the pilot does not know where she or he is. 
Within the context of long-term solutions, one should consider other technological interventions 
for reducing SSA violations. For example, one could develop portable radio beacons to mark the 
boundaries of SSAs. A system could monitor ATC radar data and detect an aircraft straying too 
close to a SSA and automatically send the pilot a warning such as by laser light (Associated 
Press, 2005; Avweb, 2005). Navigation aids could be modified to transmit a special signal when 
they are in a SSA. Any solution that relies on widespread ground-based and cockpit hardware 
specifically related to SSA will likely cost substantially more overall than ISARC, which uses 
only ground infrastructure and cockpit systems that are being developed anyway. Furthermore, 
only ISARC, being onboard the aircraft with access to its navigation and communication systems, 
is in the best position to evaluate the aircraft’s compliance with the SSA’s requirements –not only 
whether the aircraft is in or out of the SSA, but whether it has a clearance and is squawking the 
right code. Such other technological interventions can certainly be developed to reinforce the 
effectiveness of ISARC, but ISARC will likely provide the greatest impact on SSA violations for 
the amount of effort expended. 
5.6.7. Realization 
While it is expected that there is a market for ISARC, it may be necessary to encourage the 
private implementation of it through development and demonstrations by government aviation 
research agencies. Specifically, such an organization can work with the FAA to specify and even 
develop the infrastructure as described in Section 5.4.3. Work is necessary to determine the best 
means to implement the infrastructure, establishing ground communication links and new 
processes among FAA organizations. A research organization can also contribute by prototyping 
an ISARC-incorporating device. By studying ISARC use under realistic flight conditions, such an 
organization can provide a proof of the concept, flesh out the requirements beyond those given in 
5.1, and investigate promising avenues of implementation, as discussed in 5.5. Such preliminary 
work will do much to encourage ISARC development by industry. 
6. Additional Issues and Research 
This paper has focused on interventions to reduce violations of SSAs by focusing on providing 
pilots with better information on SSAs. There are other issues related to reducing violations or 
minimizing the impacts of violations, but further study is necessary before interventions can be 
formulated (Zuschlag, 2005). These issues include: 
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 Effectiveness of SSA communication between pilots and FSS briefers. 
 Impact of the current frequency of SSAs on ATC workload and techniques to mitigate it. 
 Effectiveness of communication between violating pilot and interceptor pilot. 
 Interceptor requirements, current suitability, and alternatives. 
 Further study, including trend analysis, of SSA violation frequencies. 
Most of the proposed interventions in this paper seek to provide better SSA information to pilots 
by changing NOTAMs, maps, cockpit displays, and other artifacts used directly by pilots. 
However, pilots also received SSA information from through FSS personnel, and there are some 
indications of communication breakdown concerning SSAs between pilots and FSS briefers. 
Zuschlag (2005) provided only the pilot’s perspective on this problem. Specific study of FSS 
briefers is called for to better understand the characteristics and seriousness of this problem. The 
deployment of new systems such as OASIS is aimed at improving FSS quality of service, but it is 
not clear if these systems will specifically address the reasons for the apparent problems with 
SSA communication. 
There have also been some indications that SSAs represent a substantial increase in workload for 
ATC, and higher workload itself may be contributing to violations and other problems 
(Landsberg, 2003; Zuschlag, 2005). Further study is needed to specifically understand the impact 
of SSAs on ATC. If the workload has increased to the point that performance is compromised, 
interventions may be called for. For example, it may be necessary to break up the airspace around 
static SSAs. When a recurrent or transitory SSA is in effect, it may be helpful to subdivide tasks 
among more controllers (e.g., one controller may be charged with just giving SSA clearances). 
After a violation has occurred, there have been cases of difficulties of communication between 
the interceptor and violator (Zuschlag, 2005), even though procedures supposedly allow effective 
communication even when no radio contact is achieved. There may be a need for an educational 
outreach for general aviation and interceptor pilots, emphasizing the importance of knowing and 
following standard intercept procedures and monitoring the emergency radio channel, especially 
when a TFR is nearby.  
The interceptor aircraft itself also warrants more careful study. The current interceptors include 
full-capability supersonic fighters such as the F-16 and passenger-type aircraft such as Blackhawk 
helicopters and Citation business jets. These represent a poor compromise of the requirements 
and can even present dangers (Zuschlag, 2005). An interceptor for SSA violations should have 
low operating costs and be able to fly at low speed. It also should be able to dash across an SSA 
to the location of the violator, communicate with a violator, possibly without relying on radios, 
maneuver and target weapons on an adversary (which may be an acrobatics-capable airplane), 
and deliver ordinance capable of downing a large aircraft.  
Government study is needed to flesh out these requirements, and find an aircraft that best fits 
them. One option is to develop an all-new aircraft, but possibly there are currently active or 
mothballed aircraft (e.g., the A-4 or AT-38) that may serve, perhaps after some minor 
modifications. Alternatively, the fully detailed requirements and performance characteristics may 
imply that a system of multiple aircraft types is best. For example, possibly multiple uninhabited 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) can patrol the same airspace cheaper than a single manned aircraft. With 
several UAVs each responsible for a smaller portion of the SSA, they would not need especially 
high dash speed. A loitering unarmed UAV may be used to initially intercept, observe, 
communicate with, and direct a violating aircraft. A high-speed armed and manned tactical 
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aircraft is scrambled only if the aircraft refuses to comply or attempts evasion. A third passenger-
type aircraft may also be available to promptly bring law enforcement personnel to the violator's 
aircraft after it has landed. 
Finally, it is important to continue to monitor the frequency of violations of SSAs. As stated 
earlier, the frequency appears to be decreasing but it may level off at an unacceptable rate if 
additional interventions are not implemented. As interventions to reduce accidental violations are 
implemented, it will be important to monitor their ultimate impact. It would be particularly 
interesting to monitor violations associated with presidential TFRs to evaluate the effectiveness of 
communication about them. Presidential TFRs include large Control Level 2 SSAs, which, based 
on the early experience of the DC and New York ADIZs, can be hypothesized to be associated 
with substantial numbers of violations. This hypothesis has yet to be tested, however. 
7. Summary 
This paper suggests interventions to reduce the violations of SSAs. As a rule, a pilot does not 
deliberately violate a SSA. Pilots in general feel strongly motivated to avoid such violations and 
take such violations and the general need for SSAs very seriously (Zuschlag, 2005). Violations 
are pilot errors mostly due to the pilot’s lack of knowledge or understanding of a SSA. The 
interventions in this paper seek to improve this knowledge and understanding. In the short-term, 
interventions are focused on improving the form and format of the information on SSAs 
contained in NOTAMs, along with providing additional channels for SSA information, such as on 
aeronautical charts. In many ways the past three years have been an experiment, with various 
kinds of SSAs tried to seek a good balance between security and free access to the skies. Now 
there should be enough experience to standardize SSAs, which itself should reduce violations. A 
proposed long-term intervention dovetails well with existing and emerging technologies to 
provide pilots with SSA situation awareness and alerts in the cockpit, where it is needed most. 
The philosophy behind these interventions is to acknowledge the problem SSAs present for pilots 
and to find feasible solutions that best address the problem, whether the cost of solution is 
initially borne by pilots, the government, or industry. The shear frequency of violations indicates 
that current means of addressing violations through sanctioning pilots is ineffective. The nation is 
not one ounce more secure by intercepting and punishing accidental violators. In fact, it is less 
secure. 
8. Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ADIZ ............ Air Defense Identification Zone 
ADS-B.......... Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast 
AEA.............. Aircraft Electronics Association 
AFD.............. Airport/Facility Directory 
AFSS ............ Automated Flight Service Station 
AIM .............. Aeronautical Information Manual 
AOPA........... Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association 
ARP .............. Aerospace Recommended Practice 
  
 
 48
ATC.............. Air Traffic Control 
ATIS ............. Automatic Terminal Information Service 
AWOS .......... Automated Weather Observing System 
BGAN........... Broadband Global Area Network 
CFR .............. Code of Federal Regulations 
CTAF............ Common Traffic Advisory Frequency 
DC ................ District of Columbia 
DME............. Distance Measuring Equipment 
DUAT........... Direct User Access Terminal 
DUATS......... Direct User Access Terminal System 
EFB............... Electronic Flight Bag 
FAA.............. Federal Aviation Administration 
FANS............ Future Air Navigation System 
FBO .............. Fixed Base Operator 
FDC .............. Flight Data Center 
FIS-B ............ Flight Information Service - Broadcast 
FRZ............... Flight Restricted Zone 
FSS ............... Flight Service Station  
FTI................ FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure 
GPS............... Global Positioning System  
HIWAS......... Hazardous In-flight Weather Advisory Service 
HTML........... Hypertext Mark-up Language 
ICNS............. Integrated Communications, Navigation and Surveillance 
IFR................ Instrument Flight Rules 
IMAPS.......... Internet Marine and Aviation Planning Services 
ISARC .......... Integrated System for Airspace Requirements Compliance 
METAR........ Meteorological Report 
MHz.............. MegaHertz 
MSL.............. Mean Sea Level  
NAIMES....... NAS Aeronautical Information Management Enterprise System 
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NAS.............. National Airspace System 
NASA........... National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NDB ............. Nondirectional Beacon 
NGATS......... Next Generation Air Transportation System 
nm................. Nautical Mile 
NORAD........ North American Aerospace Defense Command 
NOTAM ....... Notice to Airmen  
NSA.............. National Security Area 
NTSC............ National Transportation Systems Center 
OASIS .......... Operational and Supportability Implementation System 
PDF............... Portable Document Format 
RTCA ........... Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
SFRA............ Special Flight Rules Area 
SSA............... Security-Supporting Airspaces 
STI................ Scientific and Technical Information 
SUA.............. Special Use Airspace 
SUA/ISE....... Special Use Airspace/Inflight Service Enhancement 
SWIM........... System Wide Information Management 
TAF .............. Terminal Aerodrome Forecast 
TCA.............. Terminal Control Area 
TFR............... Temporary Flight Restriction 
TIBS ............. Telephone Information Briefing Service 
TRACON ..... Terminal Radar Approach Control 
TSA .............. Transportation Security Administration 
TSO .............. Technical Standard Order 
TWEB........... Transcribed Weather Broadcast 
UAT.............. Universal Access Transceiver 
UAV ............. Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles 
US................. United States 
USSS ............ United States Secret Service 
  
 
 50
VFR .............. Visual Flight Rules 
VHF.............. Very High Frequency 
VIP ............... Very Important Person 
VOR ............. VHF Omnidirectional Range 
WAAS .......... Wide Area Augmentation System 
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Appendices 
Consolidated Mockup of Formatted NOTAM 5/1953 
The following consolidation of Figure 4, Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8 is a mockup of a 
complete NOTAM using formatting and graphic techniques discussed in Sections 4.1.2, 4.2.2, 
4.2.4, and 4.3.1 for improving pilot awareness of the presence, boundaries, and requirements for a 
SSA. This may be compared to that currently available from the FAA as shown in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2. Such a consolidated NOTAM may be included in or linked from a preflight briefing 
report. The last portion of text (labeled Restrictions 1 and Restrictions 2) are not necessary if SSA 
requirements are standardized, as described in 4.3.3. 
FDC 5/1953. Located 8 nm from flight plan. High relevance for Any Flight.
Flight Restrictions
Pensacola, FL, March 18 2005, 7:50 – 12:05 local
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Map Reference  Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Area 2 
Restrictions 2 1 
Location Lat 
Long 
30 28 24 N 
087 11 15 W 
30 21 10 N 
087 19 01W 
30 28 24 N 
087 11 15 W 
30 21 10 N 
087 19 01W 
 Fix CEW 228 033.7 BFM 108 041.3 CEW 228 033.7 BFM 108 041.3 
Radius  30 nm* 10 nm 
Ceiling MSL FL 180 
Time  Zulu 05 03 18 1350 
05 03 18 1805 
05 03 18 1350 
05 03 18 1455 
05 03 18 1415  
05 03 18 1640 
05 03 18 1600 
05 03 18 1805 
 Local 0750 03/18/05 
1205 03/18/05 
0750 03/18/05 
0855 03/18/05 
0815 03/18/05 
1040 03/18/05 
1000 03/18/05 
1205 03/18/05 
Duration  4:15 hrs 1:05 hrs 2:25 hrs 2:05 hrs 
Public Airports within 1J9 
2R4 
5R4 
82J 
83J 
JKA 
NPA 
NSE 
PNS 
82J 
83J 
NPA 
82J 
83J 
NPA 
PNS 
82J 
83J 
NPA 
*Excluding airspace overlapping with Areas 2 and 3 during their respective active times. 
 
Restrictions 1 (see map reference Areas 2 and 3) 
Prohibited: All aircraft operations. 
Exceptions:  
Law enforcement and military aircraft directly supporting the United States Secret Service 
(USSS) and the Office of the President of the United States,  
Emergency medical flights in which the flight operations company coordinates operations in 
advance with the USSS at 850-444-5646 in order to avoid potential delays. 
Regularly scheduled commercial passenger and all-cargo carriers arriving into and/or departing 
from 14 CFR Part 139 airports and operating under any of the following:  
Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program (AOSSP),  
Domestic Security Integration Program (DSIP),  
Twelve Five Standard Security Program (TFSSP),  
All-Cargo International Security Procedure (ACISP) 
Restrictions 2 (see map reference Area 1) 
Requirements: All aircraft shall  
Be on an active IFR or VFR flight plan.  
Squawk an ATC-assigned discrete transponder code prior to departure and at all times in the TFR.  
Remain in two-way radio communications with ATC. 
Exceptions:  
Emergency medical flights in which the flight operations company coordinates operations in 
advance with the USSS at 850-444-5646 in order to avoid potential delays. 
Prohibited:  
Loitering. 
Flight training. 
Practice instrument approaches. 
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Aerobatic flight. 
Glider operations. 
Parachute operations. 
Ultralight flight. 
Hang gliding. 
Ballooning. 
Agriculture/crop dusting. 
Animal population control flight operations. 
Banner towing.  
Additional Information: All USSS cleared aircraft operators based in the area should notify the USSS at 850-
444-5646 prior to their departure.  
Notes 
It is recommended that all aircraft operators check NOTAMs frequently for possible required changes to this TFR prior to 
operations within this region.  
These flight restrictions are pursuant to title 14, section 91.141, of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). 
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Interventions and Actions to Perform 
The following lists all recommended interventions in this document with cross-references to the 
document's body. Given with each intervention are the specific causes of SSA violations (see 
Table 1) that the intervention addresses. For each intervention, the necessary actions to realize it 
are given, broken down by actor: 
 Government research agencies, or research agencies sponsored by the government. 
 Government service and regulatory agencies or offices and their contractors. 
 Private industry, providing products and services directly to pilots or aircraft operators. 
Actions are listed in tabular format with each row specifying the actions that are contingent on 
each other. In general, the research should be conducted first, followed by actions regarding 
government services or regulations, followed by the actual development of products and services 
by industry, although industry may choose to conduct its own research, and develop a product in 
anticipation of supporting government regulations or services. 
Intervention: Support Sorting, Filtering, or Highlighting Briefing Reports (Section 4.1.1) 
Cause of Violations Addressed: SSA not known about or recalled. 
Actions: 
Government Research Government Services & 
Regulations 
Industry  
Determine keywords or fields 
to best categorize NOTAMs. 
 
Add keywords to NOTAMs.  Develop preflight briefing 
applications to sort/filter/ 
highlight NOTAMs based on 
keywords 
Study feasibility of distributing 
NOTAMs with as fields of 
database records. 
Format NOTAMs by database 
fields rather than free text.  
Develop preflight briefing 
applications to manipulate the 
appearance of NOTAMs 
based on the field values and 
flight plan. 
 Proceed with deployment of 
OASIS and SUA/ISE systems 
 
Intervention: Standardize, Format, and Improve Text Descriptions (Sections 4.1.2, 4.2.4, 
4.3.1) 
Cause of Violations Addressed:  
 Relative distance to SSA not understood. 
 SSA not known about or recalled. 
 Procedures for allowed penetration of SSA not understood. 
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Actions: 
Government Research Government Services & 
Regulations 
Industry  
Determine format for improved 
readability, scanability, and 
understandability of NOTAMs. 
Format or markup NOTAMs 
for easier scanning or reading. 
 
Display NOTAMs in marked-
up form in preflight briefing 
reports. 
 Standardize shapes of 
transitory SSAs. 
 
 Standardize boundary  
descriptions to always 
reference a navigation aid and 
always use MSL altitude. 
 
 List public airports affected by 
SSA 
 
Intervention: Provide interactive graphic summary in preflight briefing reports (Section 0). 
Cause of Violations Addressed: SSA not known about or recalled. 
Actions: 
Government Research Industry  
Study usefulness of an interactive graphic 
summary in preflight briefing reports. 
Implement summary, contingent on research 
findings. 
Intervention: Include SUA activations in NOTAMs (Section 0).  
Cause of Violations Addressed: SSA not known about or recalled. 
Actions: 
Government Services & Regulations 
Develop means to route SUA information into NOTAM system. 
Intervention: Support personalized updates in briefings (Section 0). 
Cause of Violations Addressed: SSA not known about or recalled. 
Actions: 
Government Services & Regulations Industry  
Support personalized updates in FSS briefings. Support personalized updates in electronic 
briefing services. 
Intervention: Chart Recurrent and Static SSAs (Sections 4.1.4, 4.2.1).  
Cause of Violations Addressed:  
 Relative distance to SSA not understood. 
 SSA not known about or recalled. 
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Actions: 
Government Research Government Services & 
Regulations 
Industry  
 Formalize the definitions of 
static and recurrent SSAs. 
 
Study and provide 
recommendations on 
streamlining charting of SSAs. 
Streamline process for putting 
SSAs on charts. 
 
 Maximize use of existing SUA 
types for map representation. 
 
  Show charted SSAs on 
electronic map devices. 
Intervention: Use Weather Products and Other Channels to Announce SSA Activations 
(Section 4.1.5) 
Cause of Violations Addressed: SSA not known about or recalled. 
Actions: 
Government Research Government Services & 
Regulations 
Industry  
Determine implementations for 
including SSA information in 
weather products. 
Feed and include SSA 
activation information in 
weather products. 
Support plain-text translations 
of SSA information in weather 
product in preflight briefing 
reports 
 Implement electronic shipping 
of SSA activation notice 
posters to FBOs 
 
Intervention: Specific Times and Places for All TFRs (Section 4.1.6) 
Cause of Violations Addressed: SSA not known about or recalled. 
Actions: 
Government Services & Regulations 
Chart covered facilities. 
Instate regulation requiring event organizers to notify the federal authorities of events. 
Change blanket NOTAMs to NOTAMs listing discrete activations.  
Intervention: Optimize Detail and Improved Map Readability and Understandability 
(Sections 4.2.2, 4.2.3) 
Cause of Violations Addressed: Relative distance to SSA not understood. 
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Actions: 
Government Research Industry and Government Services & Regulations 
Determine critical information and 
details to include on maps of SSAs. 
Update map web sites to use new maps. 
 Indicate map scale on maps. 
 Adjust map format for electronic displays and black-and-
white printing. 
 Support user-selected map size for electronic displays 
Intervention: Support easy electronic transmission of maps from FSS briefers (Section 4.2.5). 
Cause of Violations Addressed: Relative distance to SSA not understood. 
Actions: 
Government Services & Regulations 
Supply FSS briefers with applications to transmit maps and other graphics by email and fax. 
Intervention: Develop pilot-defined airspace alerting feature in GPS map devices (Section 
4.2.5). 
Cause of Violations Addressed: Relative distance to SSA not understood. 
Actions: 
Government Research Industry  
Study means to implement pilot-defined 
airspace alerting feature in GPS map devices. 
Implement pilot-defined airspace alerting 
feature in GPS map devices. 
Intervention: Provide machine-readable format for SSA information (Section 4.2.5). 
Cause of Violations Addressed: Relative distance to SSA not understood. 
Actions: 
Government Research Government Services & 
Regulations 
Industry  
Study best means of 
formatting SSA information for 
machine reading. 
Develop standards for 
formatting SSA information for 
machine reading. 
Develop and distribute 
machine-readable SSA 
information. 
Develop standards for 
formatting SSA information for 
machine reading. 
Develop applications to 
automatically read and map 
such distributed information. 
Intervention: Standardize and Simplify the SSA Procedures (Section 0) 
Cause of Violations Addressed: Procedures for allowed penetration of SSA not understood. 
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Actions: 
Government Research Government Services & 
Regulations 
Industry  
Study feasibility of FSS 
controllers delivering SSA 
clearances directly to pilots. 
Study means of implementing 
electronic flight plan activation 
and automated clearance 
delivery.  
Develop and standardize on 
single nation-wide 
communication channel for 
SSA clearances. 
In TFR NOTAMs, inform pilots 
of available channels. 
Provide applications to 
support electronic flight plan 
activation and automated 
clearance delivery.  
Intervention: Standardize SSA Control Levels (Sections 4.2.1, 4.3.3).  
Cause of Violations Addressed: Procedures for allowed penetration of SSA not understood. 
Actions: 
Government Research Government Services & 
Regulations 
Industry  
Study consolidation of SSA 
requirement to a few standard 
categories, maintaining 
security while maximizing 
access to airspace. 
Define, standardize, and name 
control levels. 
Document and use standard 
control levels in NOTAMs and 
publications such as the AIM 
and AFD. 
 
Develop map symbology for 
SSA control levels. 
Print maps and charts using 
new symbology. 
Use new symbology on 
electronic map displays. 
Intervention: Provide educational outreach and support training on SSAs (Section 0) 
Cause of Violations Addressed: Procedures for allowed penetration of SSA not understood. 
Actions: 
Government Services & Regulations 
Adjust ATC and FSS phraseology to emphasize key requirements of SSAs  
Conduct educational outreach. 
Intervention: Research, develop, and deploy ISARC (Section 5) 
Cause of Violations Addressed:  
 Relative distance to SSA not understood. 
 SSA not known about or recalled. 
 Procedures for allowed penetration of SSA not understood. 
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Actions: 
Government Research Government Services & 
Regulations 
Industry  
Validation of functional, 
infrastructure, and 
performance requirements. 
Use requirements to plan 
infrastructure development. 
Use requirements to plan 
development of devices with 
ISARC. 
Continuing testing and 
developing modern datalink 
capabilities. 
Deploy high bandwidth 
datalink nationwide. 
Develop services using 
datalink to transmit up-to-date 
SSA information to en route 
aircraft. 
Study means of distinguishing 
taxiing from imminent takeoff 
using WAAS data. 
Complete deployment of 
WAAS. 
Implement taxiing detection in 
air space alerting components 
of GPS moving map devices. 
Develop proof-of-concept 
prototype ISARC. 
Study user interface issues, 
developing guidelines for 
simplifying interaction, 
especially for challenging form 
factors. 
Study impact of providing 
recommended courses to 
avoid SSAs. 
Work with industry standards 
committees to define ISARC 
performance standards, then 
subsequent write a TSO citing 
them. 
Develop on-board devices with 
ISARC, possibly integrated 
with a GPS moving map 
device. 
Study means of implementing 
electronic flight plan activation 
with automated SSA clearance 
delivery. 
Investigate usefulness of 
automated clearance delivery 
for other applications such as 
NGATS. 
 
Continue to develop and 
deploy infrastructure for intra- 
and inter-agency information 
transfer. 
Plan, develop, and deploy 
electronic flight plan activation 
with automated SSA clearance 
delivery. 
Develop devise with ISARC 
that support electronic flight 
plan activation with automated 
SSA clearance delivery 
Prototype demonstration of 
always-on emergency 
communication channel for 
digital radios. 
Working with industry 
standards committees, define 
and standardize an always-on 
emergency communication 
channel 
Develop digital radios 
including an always-on 
emergency communication 
channel. 
Other research questions (Section 6) 
 Effective SSA communication between pilots and FSS briefers. 
 Impact of the current frequency of SSAs on ATC workload and techniques to mitigate it. 
 Effectiveness of communication between violating pilot and interceptor pilot. 
 Interceptor requirements, current suitability, and alternatives. 
 Further study, including trend analysis, of SSA violation frequencies. 
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